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The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:
Conceptual and Interpretive Issues
KarenA Jordan

51 Vand. L. Rev. 1149 (1998)

Recent decisions have signaled a subtle shift away from the Supreme
Court's categorical approach to the issue of federal preemption of state law,
and toward a preemption continuum in which the impliedpreemption theories
may inform an express preemption analysis. Yet, the Court as a whole has
avoided addressingthe issues arisingfrom the integrationof the doctrines.
In this Article, ProfessorJordanexplores some of these difficult issues.
The conceptual issues concern when and how the implied theories should be
used in an analysis involving an express preemption clause. She analyzes the
Court's recent use of the implied theories in a case involving an express
preemption provision, and notes that the opinion is ground-breakingfrom a
conceptual perspective: The Court's opinion suggests that, even when
Congress has spoken through an express preemption clause, a federal
statutory scheme may impliedly preempt state laws beyond the scope of the
express clause-and beyond what would be superseded by the Supremacy
Clause due to a direct conflict. Professor Jordan thus concludes that the
Court's failure to grapplewith the issues has opened the door to integrationof
the doctrines unnecessarily wide. The interpretive issue arises because the
implied preemption analysis represents a more "purposive" approach to
statutory interpretation, while the express preemption analysis reflects a
classic "textual"approach. The issue is which approach should be used in an
analysis that integratesthe doctrines.
ProfessorJordan'sanalysis reveals that the Court's recent use of textualism while applying the "standsas an obstacle" theory of implied preemption
unduly circumscribes the preemption analysis. She concludes that, although
textualism may be acceptable in some contexts, it is incompatible with the
fundamental tenets underlying the preemption doctrines.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent cases have signaled a fundamental change in the
Supreme Court's approach to the preemption doctrines. Traditionally,
the Court has taken a categorical approach. That is, the Court has
reiterated that federal law can preempt state law either expressly or
impliedly. Congress expressly preempts state law when it attempts to
define the extent to which a particular federal law will preempt state
law.'
Congress impliedly preempts state law through federal
1.
See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995) (holding express preemption provision in the Employee
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legislation that occupies a field or conflicts with state law.2 Within
both the express and implied preemption categories, a distinct method
of analysis has emerged. In implied preemption analysis, the Court
has inferred congressional intent to occupy a field when the federal
legislation involves a dominant federal interest or is sufficiently
pervasive. 3 The conflict preemption analysis has focused on whether
it is impossible for a party to comply with both federal and state
requirements, or whether a state law would sufficiently frustrate the
objectives

underlying

federal

law.4

In

contrast, the express

preemption analysis has focused on finding the meaning of the terms
used by Congress in the preemption clause. 5
When confronted with the question of preemption, the Court
has traditionally analyzed the issue in a categorical manner. 6 If the
federal law at issue contains an express preemption provision, the
Court has analyzed the language of the preemption clause and has
not purported to consider field or conflict preemption theories7
Recent preemption cases, however, have suggested a shift away from

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 does not apply to New York statutes imposing
surcharges on hospital rates); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995)
(holding express preemption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 bars state
imposed regulation of air carriers, but allows for court enforcement of contract terms set by
parties); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992) (holding express
preemption provision in the federal law regulating cigarette labeling only preempts state and
federal legislatures from mandating particular cautionary statements and does not preempt
state-law damages actions).
2.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 222-23 (1983) (finding state law impliedly preempted by the Atomic
Energy Act); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (holding state laws regulating
labeling impliedly preempted by federal laws regulating net weight labeling); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (finding state law regulating the registration of aliens impliedly preempted by the federal Alien Registration Act).
3.
See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
4.
See infra notes 96-129 and accompanying text.
5.
See infra notes 130-143 and accompanying text.
6.
See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 83 (1990) (analyzing text and
congressional intent of Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to find that disputed claim was not
clearly and manifestly preempted by Act); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (holding that the United States Warehouseman Act preempted state laws regulating
grain warehouses).
7.
See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995) (deciding that the text alone did not provide sufficient
evidence of congressional intent regarding the express preemption clause at issue, but declining
to explicitly consider the implied preemption doctrines); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513
U.S. 219, 221, 235, 238 (1995) (spawning three opinions by the Supreme Court due to different
interpretations of the express preemption provision at issue, without one Justice considering the
implied doctrines); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (stating expressly
that the implied theories were irrelevant to the analysis of the express preemption provision at
issue).
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the categorical approach.8 Specifically, the cases suggest that the
Court as a whole agrees that an express preemption provision does
not foreclose consideration of the implied preemption doctrines. 9
Beyond that, however, the cases reveal a tension among the Justices
regarding the extent to which implied preemption principles should
inform the interpretation of an express preemption provision. It is
not clear that the Justices would readily engage in a wholesale
incorporation of the principles into a traditional express preemption
analysis. The reasons for the hesitancy may stem from the theoretical
and ideological differences between the express and implied
Because of these differences, difficult
preemption doctrines.
conceptual and interpretive issues must be confronted as the
preemption paradigm shifts away from a categorical approach. 10
Yet, the Court has demonstrated a reluctance to grapple with
these difficult issues. For example, in Boggs v. Boggs, in which a five
Justice majority held that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") preempted Louisiana's community property law
to the extent that it permitted the spouse of an ERISA plan
participant to make a testamentary transfer of her interest in the
participant's pension plan benefits, the Court avoided addressing
issues crucial to the integration of the preemption doctrines." The
Court used an implied preemption analysis to resolve the question of
preemption under ERISA, which contains an express preemption
provision. 12 The Court has resolved numerous ERISA preemption
cases, but has never before explicitly looked to the implied preemption
doctrines to inform its analysis. Thus, the Boggs decision confirms
the shift away from the categorical approach to preemption and to-

8.

See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997) (using the implied

"stands as an obstacle" theory of preemption in a case involving a federal law with an express
preemption provision); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
117 S. Ct. 832, 843 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating an abandonment of the Court's

traditional approach to the preemption analysis of federal law with an express preemption
provision and for the use of the implied theories of preemption); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 502-03, 509-10 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Breyer, J., concurring) (both noting
that it makes sense to look to the implied theories of preemption when an express preemption
provision is ambiguous).
See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) (holding no express or im9.
plied preemption because it is possible to comply with both federal and state requirements); see
also infra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. 117 S. Ct. at 1761 ("We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase 'relate to'

provides further and additional support for the pre-emption claim. Nor need we consider the
applicability of field pre-emption.").
12. See infra Part HI.B-C and Part V.A.

19981

PREEMPTIONPARADIGM

1153

ward a preemption continuum in which implied theories of preemption may inform an express preemption analysis.
However, the Boggs decision also reflects the tension between
the Justices as the Court avoided addressing issues crucial to the
integration of the preemption doctrines.
First, the conceptual
questions: If the implied theories may be relevant in an express
analysis, when are they relevant and how should they be used?
Should the implied theories be viewed as merely another means of
defining the scope of the terms in the express preemption clause? Or,
should the theories be used as a supplemental means of finding state
laws preempted-beyond the scope of the express preemption clause,
and perhaps beyond the direct operation of the Supremacy Clause?
Second, the implied theories evolved during a period when the Court
used a more purposive approach to statutory interpretation.3 Yet,
both the majority and dissent in Boggs used a textual approach to
resolve the preemption question. 4 This approach yielded an unsatisfactory analysis of the preemption question: The Court's holding that
ERISA preempts state community property law has significant federalism implications and is inadequately supported by reasoned analysis. Thus, Boggs also reveals an interpretive issue presented by the
shifting preemption paradigm: namely, in using the implied theories,
which approach to statutory interpretation, textual or purposive, will
more likely lead to sound outcomes given the important policies implicated by preemption?
This Article explores the difficult conceptual and interpretive
issues presented by the integration of implied theories of preemption
into express preemption analysis. The Article first explains the development of the conceptual and interpretive issues. Part II reveals
the Court's mixed signals regarding the shift away from a categorical
approach to preemption and explores why the Justices may be reluctant to integrate the implied and express preemption doctrines. The
13. This Article uses the term "purposive" broadly to encompass those approaches to
statutory interpretation that look beyond the text and structure of the statute. A purposive approach encourages courts, when interpreting statutory provisions, to consider the context and
background of the statute, including relevant legislative history. While the "intent" of the
legislature is always the touchstone of statutory interpretation, a purposive approach recognizes
that it may be impossible to attribute a particular intent to a collective group of legislators and
therefore, instead, tries to ensure that the "purpose" underlying the law is effectuated and that
the law's interpretation and application is reasonable. See infra notes 238-257 and accompanying text.
14. The term "textual" is also used broadly in this article to encompass those statutory
interpretation theories that focus predominantly on the text and structure of the statute at
issue. A textual approach to interpretation emphasizes the plain meaning or dictionary definition of statutory terms. See infra notes 285-309 and accompanying text.
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analysis concludes that, from a doctrinal perspective, the Court's
hesitancy is unwarranted because the distinctions between the doctrines are largely due to the use of different approaches to statutory
interpretation. Part III explores the conceptual issues and the ramifications of the Boggs majority's failure to address these issues. The
majority opinion would permit the use of the implied preemption
doctrines in any case involving an express preemption provision; and
the theories could be used to justify preemption beyond the scope of
the express preemption clause. Thus, the Article concludes that the
Boggs majority has opened the door to integration of the doctrines
unnecessarily wide.
Lastly, Part IV of the Article explores the interpretive issue:
whether a textual approach to interpretation is appropriate when
applying the implied preemption doctrines. The Article points out the
fundamental weakness in the Boggs analysis caused by the Court's
reliance on a textual approach to statutory interpretation. Both the
majority and the dissenting opinions failed to conduct a sufficient
search for the purpose underlying the federal provisions at issue, the
key inquiry in the implied conflict preemption analysis. The result is
a holding with serious federalism implications unsupported by wellreasoned analysis. The Article demonstrates that the implied
theories evolved during, and reflect, a more purposive approach to
statutory interpretation. Accordingly, rather than a textual approach,
which results in a "purported" search for purposes, the implied
conflict preemption theories require an honestly purposive approach
to interpreting congressional intent. The Article supports this
conclusion by showing why a purposive approach better serves
important policies implicated by the preemption doctrines.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTUAL AND
INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

The Court's traditionally categorical approach to preemption
caused discrete methods of analysis to evolve for each category of
preemption. That is, within each category, courts engaged in distinct
inquiries. This complicates integration of the theories-both from a
doctrinal and an interpretive perspective. Further, although the
Court has noted from time to time that the categories are not rigidly
distinct,15 the Court has actually reinforced their distinctiveness by
15.

See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990).
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sending mixed signals as to the appropriateness of looking to the
implied theories to inform the express preemption analysis. This Part
explains the Court's hesitant shift away from the categorical approach
and, after analyzing the distinct inquiries associated with each
category, explores whether the judicial reluctance to integrate the
doctrines is justified.
A. The HesitantShift Away From a CategoricalParadigm
1. Preemption Generally-The Establishment of a
Categorical Approach
The preemption doctrines have a long history in American
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the doctrines have not always been well
understood. 16 Congress's capacity to preempt state laws flows from
both the powers delegated to Congress through the Constitution and
the Supremacy Clause.'7 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
provides that the Constitution and all laws made under its authority
shall be the "supreme Law of the Land."18 The supremacy of federal
law means that valid federal law overrides otherwise valid state law
in cases of conflict. However, the concept of preemption is broader
and goes beyond the constitutional question. 9 Congress has the
complete authority to define the allocation of federal and state
regulatory power over those matters within the domain of its
delegated powers. Thus, when Congress has used its delegated
powers and enacted legislation, state laws can be preempted-even in
the absence of a real conflict-without reference to the Supremacy
Clause. The preemption question then becomes one of statutory

16. Scholarly attention to the nature of preemption has been limited. But see David E.
Engdahl, Preemptive Capabilityof FederalPower, 45 U. CoLO. L. REV. 51 (1973); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994); S. Candice Hoke,
PreemptionPathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1991); Paul Wolfson,
Preemptionand Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 69 (1988).
17. Professor Gardbaum has explained that the widely held assumption that Congress's
power of preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause is not entirely accurate because the
Supremacy Clause does not grant powers but, rather, operates as a dispute resolution mechanism. See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 773-77. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 TEL L. REV. 795 (1996).
18.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

19. Laurence Tribe has explained that the validity of state regulation is assessed in constitutional terms only when Congress has chosen not to act-for example, when state regulation
is challenged as being in violation of the dormant commerce clause. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw].
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interpretation. 20 That is, preemption turns on an assessment of the
state and federal law and whether Congress intended the federal law
to invalidate a challenged state law.21 Supremacy, then, is a subset of
preemption; and preemption does not necessarily depend on a conflict
between federal and state law.22
Modern preemption doctrine has evolved significantly from its
original conception as a manifestation of the division of power between federal and state governments. Early cases show that the
Supreme Court viewed preemption as an automatic consequence of
congressional action in a field such as interstate commerce. 23 The
1930s saw a radical restructuring of American federalism in which
the Commerce Clause was interpreted as granting to Congress greatly
enlarged powers. 24 Accordingly, the concept of preemption had to
evolve to avoid the preemption of vast areas of state regulation. The
modified view of preemption recognized a presumption that state laws
would survive unless Congress clearly manifested its intent that a
25
federal statute would preempt state law.

20. See id. Arguably, if the state law is in direct conflict with federal law the matter is
constitutional. The state law is superseded as a matter of the Supremacy Clause. Even in that
case, however, the relevant statutory provisions must be interpreted to determine whether
there is a direct conflict.
21. However, Professor Gardbaum's research has shown that the Supreme Court did not
conceptualize preemption as depending on congressional intent until the 1930s. Prior to the
1930s, preemption was conceived as an automatic divestiture of state power to enact legislation
when Congress exerted its "paramount and all embracing authority" over subjects within its
delegated powers. See Gardbaum, supranote 16, at 801-07.
22. However, even the Supreme Court uses preemption and supremacy terminology
loosely. The Court often notes that "state law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause ... in
three circumstances;" thereby suggesting that all preemption of state law derives from the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
23. For example, in Southern Railyard Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 442 (1912), the Court
overturned a state law requiring railroad companies to transport tendered freight on the
grounds that, through the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress had taken possession of the field
of railroad rate regulation; and consequently, the state no longer had concurrent power to
regulate this practice. The Court in Reid explained that [ut is well settled that if the state and
Congress have a concurrent power, that of the state is superseded when the power of Congress
is exercised." Id. at 436; see also Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 801-06 (describing early cases
involving preemption).
24. In the early 1930s, under the influence of the New Deal politics, expanded powers
were accorded to Congress. See Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw,
99 YALE L.J. 453, 510-15 (1989). The scope of Congress's power has been described as follows:
"Henceforth, no area of intrastate commerce would be open to the states to regulate which at
the same time is constitutionally closed to Congress; no such area remained fully protected from
the threat of congressional intervention." See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 806.
25. See, e.g., Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 237 (1947) (reaffirming the
presumption against preemption in fields in which states have traditionally occupied absent
clear congressional intent); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 352 (1933) (upholding a state law
designed to prevent infectious cattle diseases despite the federal Cattle Contagious Diseases
Acts because congressional intent to preempt was not definite and clear).
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During this period of evolution, the Court emphasized a categorical preemption paradigm. Specifically, a three category framework for preemption emerged from Supreme Court case law.26 First,
Congress can expressly define the extent to which its enactments
preempt state law-express preemption.27 Second, in the absence of
explicit statutory language, federal law will preempt law that
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively-field preemption. 28 And third, state
law will be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law-conflict preemption. 29 Field and conflict preemption
doctrines constitute the implied preemption doctrines because they
address the question of the division of state and federal authority
when Congress has not explicitly spoken. Of course, if the federal and
state laws actually conflict, the Supremacy Clause operates to
supersede state law and there is arguably no need to infer
congressional intent to preempt the state law. ° Nonetheless, modern
preemption doctrine clings to the view that finding a conflict provides
the necessary evidence for implying congressional intent to preempt
state law.

31

Further, the Court has often suggested that the categories of
preemption are exclusive-especially as between the categories of
express and implied preemption. The Court has often explained the
categories in a manner that suggests that the implied preemption
doctrines are not relevant where Congress has spoken through an
express preemption clause. For example, the Supreme Court commonly explains the preemption principles as follows: "In the absence
of an express congressionalcommand, state law is pre-empted if that
law actually conflicts with federal law.., or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference

26. See, e.g., English, 496 U.S. at 78-79; Rice, 331 U.S. at 229; see also Robert B. Leflar &
Robert S. Adler, The PreemptionPentad: Federal Preemptionof ProductsLiability Claims After
Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REv. 691, 694 (1997) (noting that courts addressing a preemption issue
recite, "like a mantra, a formulaic incantation of black-letter law.").
27. See English, 496 U.S. at 78 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 95-98
(1983)).
28. See id. at 79 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
29. See id.
30. See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 809 (explaining that the concept of implied conflict
preemption is a contradiction in terms because, "[olnce the inquiry moves from jurisdiction to
the content of a particular piece of legislation, we are in the realm of supremacy").
31. Professor Gardbaum has noted the implausibility of this premise. Gardbaum, supra
note 17, at 809 (explaining that existence of an actual conflict should rarely provide a "sufficient
basis for inferring congressional intent to preempt state law").
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that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'"32 This
phraseology suggests that the implied doctrines only come into play in
the absence of an explicit congressional directive regarding preemption. Recently, however, the Court has suggested a shift from the
categorical approach to one which recognizes the use of implied preemption doctrines in cases involving express preemption clauses.
Indeed, the Court has expressly acknowledged that the three categories of preemption are not "rigidly distinct."33 However, the Court's
signals have been mixed, creating confusion as to when it is appropriate for the categorical walls to yield.
2. The Court's Mixed Signals as to a New Paradigm
In several cases the Court has suggested that resort to the
implied doctrines is not appropriate when an express preemption
provision exists. The Court's starkest statement to this effect is found
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 4 In a 1992 opinion drafted by
Justice Stevens, the Court in Cipollone addressed the preemptive
scope of the federal laws regulating cigarette labeling. 5 The federal
law at issue contained an express preemption provision. The Court in
Cippollone explained that the preemptive scope of the federal laws
was governed entirely by the express language of those provisions.
According to the plurality opinion,
[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in
the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing the issue, and when
that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority," "there is no need to infer congressional intent
to
36
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation.

32. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (emphasis added) (citing
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
33. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
34. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
35. Id. at 515. Specifically, the Court addressed the preemption provision which, as
modified by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, prescribes that "[n]o requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act." Id.
36. Id. at 517 (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282
(1987); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). The Court explained that this
proposition was merely a "variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius: Congress's enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies
that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted." Id.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Souter, more directly stated that resort to principles of
implied preemption is appropriate only when Congress has been
silent with respect to preemption. 37 Thus, Cipollone was interpreted
by some as establishing the rule that implied preemption analysis is
not appropriate when Congress has spoken through an express
3
preemption clause. 8
Three years later, the Court in FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick3 9
clarified that Cipollone did not categorically preclude the co-existence
of express and implied preemption analyses.40 Rather, the Court
explained that Cipollone merely "supports a reasonable
inference... that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility
of implied pre-emption."41 It does not establish a rule. 42 The Court
considered the defendants' implied preemption argument, but did not
clarify when or in what instances the Cipollone inference could be
successfully rebutted. Significantly, none of the judges issued a dis43
senting view, although Scalia concurred only in the judgment.

37. Id. at 531-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., Mary Pat Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express Federal Preemption: Where Is It
After Cipollone?, 59 DEF. CoUNs. J. 491, 493 (1992); John A. Chatowski, Cipollone and the Clear
Statement Rule: DoctrinalAnomaly or New Development in FederalPreemption, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 769, 794 (1993); Marc Z. Edell & Harriet Dinegar Milks, The Cipollone Decision:
Providing Guidelinesfor Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims, 150 N.J. LAW 37, 37
(1993). The dissenting Justices in Cipollone contributed to this construction of the plurality
opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas characterized the Stevens opinion as establishing the rule
that, "fo]nce there is an express pre-emption provision,... all doctrines of implied pre-emption
are eliminated." Cipollone, 504 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia and Thomas opined
that implied preemption principles can apply; but they also reinforced their primary position
that the language of a preemption clause should be given its ordinary meaning. See id. at 54549. Indeed, Scalia and Thomas are strong proponents of the textual approach to statutory
interpretation which gives virtually sole weight to the words Congress used. See infra notes
285-308 and accompanying text.
39.
514 U.S. 280 (1995).
40. The defendants in Myrick argued that the express preemption provision in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 precluded state common law negligence
actions. See id. at 285-86. The preemption provision precludes states from establishing any
safety standard which is not identical to a federal standard in effect. See id. at 286 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1994)). Because the federal standard by which the actions may have been
preempted was suspended, and thus not "in effect," the Court found that the actions were not
expressly preempted. Id. at 286-87. The defendants alternatively argued that the actions were
impliedly preempted; and the plaintiffs responded that Cipollone held that implied preemption
cannot exist when Congress has included an express preemption clause in a statute. See id. at
287-89.
41. Id. at 288.
42. See id. at 289. The Court also cited CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Easterwood, 505 U.S.
658, 673 (1993), as support for its statement that subsequent Supreme Court cases have not
read Cipollone as obviating the need for analysis of implied preemption given the existence of an
express preemption provision.
43. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 290.
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However, in several cases involving express preemption provisions-even cases that the Court has admitted are ambiguous-the
Court has continued to analyze the issue without any suggestion that
the implied preemption doctrines should play a role. For example, in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,4 decided in 1995, the Justices
struggled to define the scope of the preemption clause in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA"), but did not look to the implied preemption doctrines. The airline argued that the ADA preempted the
plaintiffs' state common law claims, based on the state consumer
fraud act and breach of contract, and arising out of the airline's retroactive changes in the terms and conditions of its frequent flyer program. 45 The ADA preemption clause broadly prescribes that states
shall not "enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation [or]
standard... relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier ....46 The majority opinion in Wolens held that the claims
"related to" rates and services, but that only the consumer fraud claim
was preempted.4 7 The Court attempted to base its holding on the
preemption provision's language-specifically the words "enact or
enforce any law." The Court explained that the state consumer fraud
act serves as the means for policing the marketing practices of the
airlines and, thus, the cause of action would constitute an
enforcement of a law relating to rates and services. 4s In contrast, the
contract claim would merely enforce the airline's self-imposed
49
undertaking and thus would not amount to state enforcement.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed
the
ADA would not preempt the breach of contracts claims, but
that
disagreed that the ADA provision revealed sufficient evidence of
Congress's intent to preempt general state laws prohibiting fraud. 50
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas,
could see no valid reason to find either claim outside the scope of the
preemption clause.5 1 Despite the apparent inadequacies of the
express preemption analysis, none of the Justices advocated that the
implied preemption doctrines should inform the analysis. Indeed, the
44. 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
45. See id. at 224-26.
46. Id. at 222-23 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1994)). In a prior opinion, the Court had
looked to ERISA's similarly worded preemption provision and held that the ADA preempts any
state law which has a "connection with or reference to 'airline rates, routes, or services'."
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
47. 513 U.S. at 226.
48. See id. at 227-28.
49. See id. at 228-33.
50. See id. at 235-37 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
51. See id. at 240 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).

1998]

PREEMPTIONPARADIGM

1161

dissenting opinion stated that the majority overstepped its role in the
preemption analysis by "arriv[ing] at what might be a reasonable
policy judgment as to when state law actions against airlines should
be preempted if we were free to legislate it,"52 thereby suggesting that
the majority may have "impliedly" and erroneously engaged in an
implied preemption analysis by looking to the purpose underlying
deregulation and other regulatory provisions.
Similarly, in cases involving ERISA's express preemption provisions, the majority of the Court has never expressly suggested that
the implied theories of preemption should inform the express preemption analysis. As explained in Part III.B, ERISA contains an express
preemption provision which states that ERISA shall supersede any
state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. 53 In the early
1980s, the Supreme Court, following a traditional express preemption
analysis, looked to Black's Law Dictionary to determine that a law
satisfied the "relates to" test if it had a "connection with or reference
to" an employee benefit plan. 54 This remained the standard for ERISA
preemption until 1995 when, in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Court
acknowledged that the issue of preemption could not be resolved by
looking to the words "relate to" or the "connection with" test.5 5 The
Court held that the objectives underlying ERISA must provide a guide
as to the scope of state law that Congress expected to survive the Act's
56
passage.
However, the Court did not shift to an implied preemption
analysis. Instead, the Court refined the express preemption analysis.
That is, looking to prior preemption cases it had decided, the Court
established a benchmark for when laws have a connection with
ERISA plans such that ERISA's objectives are implicated.5 7 The
Court held that the state law at issue did not have a sufficient
"connection with" ERISA plans because it did not either bind ERISA
plan administrators to any particular choice or preclude uniform

52. Id. at 238 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
54. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
55. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56 (1995).
56. Id. at 656-57.
57. See id. at 657 (finding that, in prior cases, ERISA preempted state laws that mandated
employee benefit structures or their administration, or that provided an alternative enforcement mechanism).
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administrative practices or the provision of uniform interstate benefit
packages.8
Just one year later, however, some Justices began to state
clearly that the analysis of express preemption provisions should be
informed by the implied preemption doctrines. In Barnett Bank v.
Nelson, the Court addressed whether a federal statute that permitted
national banks to sell insurance in small towns preempted a state
statute prohibiting banks from selling most kinds of insurance. 59 The
federal law did not contain an express preemption provision, so the
Court engaged in an implied preemption analysis. Yet Justice Breyer,
writing for an unanimous Court, was careful to explain that, often,
explicit preemption language does not directly answer the question
and courts must then consider whether the "federal statute's
'structure and purpose,' or nonspecific statutory language,
nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent."60 Justice
Breyer clearly indicated that he was referring to the implied
preemption doctrines by further explaining that congressional intent
could be inferred from a pervasive scheme of regulation, an
irreconcilable conflict, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.61
Justice Breyer reiterated his view that implied preemption
doctrines should play a role in the interpretation of express provisions
a few months later in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.62 Justice Breyer expressed in a concurring opinion that, if the language of an express
preemption clause is ambiguous, courts must look elsewhere for
Congress's intent and "[ilt makes sense, in the absence of any indication of a contrary congressional.., intent, to read the pre-emption

58. Id. at 661. At issue in Travelers was a New York in-patient, hospital rate-setting
scheme. See id. at 648. The challenged provisions required hospitals to add specified
surcharges onto bills paid by commercial insurers and HMOs, but not onto bills paid by Blue
Cross. The law, therefore, affected ERISA plans because the amount of the surcharges was
passed on to health plan purchasers (employers), thereby influencing some employers to switch
to Blue Cross plans. However, because the effect of the law was only to "influence shopping
decisions," it did not satisfy the refined test for when a law has a sufficient connection with
ERISA plans to warrant preemption. See id. at 660; see also DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. &
Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1749 (1997) (upholding the state law at issue
as not preempted by ERISA without looking to the implied doctrines).
59. 517 U.S. 25, 27 (1996).
60. Id. at 31 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
61. See id. at 1108 (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 318, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
62. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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statute... in light of [the] basic [implied] preemption principles."63
The plurality opinion, however, adhered to a traditional express preemption analysis with no reference to implied preemption doctrines.
The call to use implied preemption principles in cases involving express preemption provisions appeared most recently in a concurring opinion in California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc.64 The Dillingham
majority analyzed the issue by applying the conventional view of
ERISA preemption: a state law is preempted if it has a connection
with or reference to an ERISA plan. Following the Travelers decision,
the Dillingham Court held that California's law was indistinguishable
because the "apprenticeship portion of the prevailing wage statute
does not bind ERISA plans to anything. No apprenticeship program
is required by California law to meet California's standards."65 The
majority also articulated a new test for when a "reference to" ERISA
plans will result in preemption, namely, if the state law "acts
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans.., or where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation .... "66 As
in Travelers, the majority in Dillingham did not look to implied
preemption principles, but instead refined the express preemption
analysis.
However, the concurring opinion in Dillingham expressed the
view that, rather than adhering to a traditional express preemption
analysis, the Court should interpret ERISA's preemption provision as
indicating that Congress intended the principles of ordinary field and
conflict preemption to apply.67 Interestingly, the concurring Justices
suggested that the Court had already set forth this "new" approach to
ERISA preemption four years earlier in John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank.68 However, John
Hancock was not a traditional preemption case. Rather, the Court

63. Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).
64. 519 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997). Dillingham involved an ERISA preemption
challenge to a California law which, although generally requiring the prevailing wage in a
locale, permits contractors on public works projects to pay a lower wage to workers participating
in apprenticeship programs that meet certain state sanctioned standards. The state standards,
in turn, are substantially similar to those promulgated under the National Apprenticeship Act.
See id. at 835-36.
65. Id. at 841.
66. Id. at 838 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 843 (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
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was asked to decide whether ERISA's fiduciary duties applied to an
insurance company's conduct in relation to certain annuities.69
The preemption issue arose in John Hancock because the defendant argued that ERISA's fiduciary standards could not govern an
insurer's administration of annuity contracts because, under ERISA's
savings clause, federal law must yield to state regulation of insurance.70 The Court agreed that state regulation of an insurer's management of general account assets, although "relating to" employee
benefit plans, would be saved from preemption. Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that Congress could regulate insurers through
ERISA7' and held that ERISA's fiduciary duties could apply even if
they conflicted with state insurance regulation-because ERISA calls
for federal supremacy if state and federal laws "cannot be
harmonized."72 It was in this context that the Court opined that
we discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA,
intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis. State law
governing insurance generally is not displaced, but "where [that] law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
73
Congress," federal preemption occurs.

Thus, it is difficult to interpret John Hancock as pronouncing that
implied preemption doctrines generally should inform the
interpretation of ERISA's express preemption provision. Rather, the
context of the Court's statement suggests that it was describing
preemption of a law which, although saved from ERISA preemption
as a regulation of insurance, is in conflict with a federal law.
In sum, the Court's recent cases have sent a mixed message as
to the extent to which the implied preemption doctrines should play a
role in construing express preemption provisions. The cases suggest
that the Court as a whole agrees that an express preemption provision does not foreclose consideration of the implied preemption doctrines. However, not all of the Justices are ready for a wholesale
69. See id. at 99. Resolution of the issue required the Court to interpret the scope of the
exclusion from "plan assets" for "guaranteed benefit policies." Thus, the primary focus of the
opinion was on the interpretation of guaranteed benefit policies. See id. at 101-10.
70. See id. at 97-98. ERISA's savings clause expressly exempts from preemption any state
law "which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
71. See JohnHancock, 510 U.S. at 98.
72. Id. at 98. That is, subsection (a) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012
(1994), reaffirms that states may regulate the business of insurance. However, subsection (b)
clarifies that, although federal law will not generally supersede state insurance regulation,
federal laws will invalidate state insurance laws if the federal law "specifically relates to" the
business of insurance. Id.
73. Id. at 99 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)).
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incorporation of the doctrines into a traditional express preemption
analysis. This is understandable because to do so would constitute a
dramatic shift from the traditional categorical approach to
preemption. The Justices' hesitancy may stem from uncertainty as to
how an incorporation of the principles of implied preemption might
alter the Court's conception of the express preemption analysis.
Indeed, the majority opinion in Boggs expressly declined to venture
into this conceptual quagmire. The obvious question is why. Is there
really a conceptual distinction between the doctrines of express and
implied preemption?
B. Is JudicialResistance to a New PreemptionParadigmJustified?
To determine whether there is a sufficient conceptual distinction between the express and implied preemption theories to justify
the Court's hesitant approach to their integration, it is necessary to
analyze the discrete inquiries associated with each category of preemption. This Part analyzes the essence of the inquiry in each category and whether there is any real conceptual distinction between the
implied and express doctrines.
1. Implied Preemption Inquiries
The touchstone of the implied preemption analysis is congressional intent to preempt state law. Traditionally, the Court has recognized that congressional intent to preempt state laws may be inferred where the state law regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the federal government to occupy exclusively-field preemption;7 4 or when state law actually conflicts with federal law-conflict
preemption.7 5 As noted, the Court has developed discrete inquiries
associated with each category of preemption. These inquiries help to
determine when congressional intent to preempt should be inferred.
The Court has inferred a congressional intent to occupy a field from a
"'scheme of federal regulation... so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it', or where an act of Congress 'touch[es] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' "76 The

74.

See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

75.
76.

See id.
Id.

1166

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1149

requisite intent for conflict preemption has been inferred when the
Court finds that it is "impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements," 77 or "where state law 'stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' "178 However, if the federal legislation is in
a field that the states have traditionally occupied, the Court has held
that it will infer neither field nor conflict preemption absent clear and
manifest evidence of congressional intent. 9
Field preemption based on a dominant federal interest requires more than an important federal interest. The Court has explained that, because every subject that merits federal legislation is a
subject of national concern, the analysis requires a finding of some
"special features" warranting preemption.80 For example, in Hines v.
Davidowitz, the Court held that the Federal Alien Registration Act
preempted a state law regulating the registration of aliens because of
"the supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign
affairs,"81 including immigration, naturalization and deportation. The
Court explained that, because this field affected international
relations and demanded broad national authority, any concurrent
82
state power that existed was limited to the narrowest of ranges.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the Court found that the special
dangers of Communist seditious activities to the United States as well
as to freedom throughout the world created a field in which the
federal interest was dominant.8
77. Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
78. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). However, the Court has
cautioned that, although it often invokes the three-category framework, the categories of
implied preemption are not rigidly distinct. See id. at 79-80 n.5.
79. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664-65 (1993);
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (applying the limitation to conffict preemption).
80. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
81. 312U.S. 52, 62(1941).
82. See id. at 66-67.
83. See 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956). In contrast, the Court has held that, although Congress
enacted a scheme which resulted in federally approved standards for gauging the maturity of
avocados, the maturity of avocados was not a subject "by its very nature admitting only of
national supervision." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44
(1963). The Court has also suggested that the degree of prior state regulation in a field is
relevant to the inquiry. In Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 194-95, the Court was asked to determine
whether Congress, through the Atomic Energy Act, had revealed an intent to preempt the field
of nuclear regulation. The state law allegedly preempted was a moratorium on new nuclear
plants in California until a method of disposal for high-level nuclear waste was developed and
approved by the Federal Energy Commission. See id. at 198. The Court found that the
moratorium was designed to address an economic issue; namely, that, without a permanent
means of disposal, the nuclear waste problem could become critical and lead to unpredictably
high costs. See id. at 216. Further, the Court found that the "[nleed for new power facilities,
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Case law suggests, however, that field preemption on the basis
of a dominant federal interest is difficult to prove. This is because, if
a court identifies a field that Congress has intended to preserve for
federal regulation based solely on the federal interest, the states
would be deemed powerless to act-even if Congress has not regulated either in the field or specifically regarding the issue addressed
by the challenged state law. Field preemption creates a regulatory
vacuum that courts must honor because, in theory, Congress
deliberately created the vacuum. Accordingly, case law also shows
that the Court will seek to narrow the scope of the preemptive field to
mitigate against the impact of field preemption. For example, in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Commission, the utility argued that a state provision
which imposed a moratorium on the certification required to build a
new nuclear plant8
was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act
("AEA") because Congress intended the Act to "preserve the Federal
Government as the sole regulator of all matters nuclear."85 The Court
adopted the narrower view that the federal government had occupied
only the field of nuclear safety concerns. 86 Thus, although the weight
[and] their economic feasibility"-i.e., the economic aspects of electrical generation-had been
traditionally regulated "for many years and in great detail" by the states. Id. at 205. A
consideration of the extent of prior state regulation would suggest that the inquiry may, in some
cases, involve a balancing of the federal and state interests.
84. The moratorium was imposed until such time as the state energy commission determined that technology or the means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste had been
developed and existed, and had been approved by the appropriate federal agency. See Pacific
Gas, 461 U.S. at 197-98 (citing section 25524.2 of the 1976 amendments to the Warren-Alquist
Act). Another provision of the amendments was similarly challenged, but the Court found that
this challenge was not yet ripe. See id. at 200-03.
85. Id. at 205.
86. See id. at 212. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on several factors. First,
the Court found that the need for new power facilities and their economic feasibility are areas
which have been traditionally regulated by the states. See id. at 206. Second, the Court
considered the history of federal regulation of nuclear matters, namely, that when Congress
decided to encourage private sector involvement in 1954, the legislation left no role for the
states. See id. at 207. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sought to encourage private sector
involvement subject to federal regulation and licensing of construction, ownership and operation
of commercial nuclear power plants. See id. However, the federal agency then repealed a
regulation concerning the financial qualifications of a utility proposing to construct a plant,
stating that financial qualifications are only of concern if related to the public health and safety.
See id. Further, a statutory provision in the Act expressly provided that the Act shall not affect
the authority or regulations of any state or local agency 'with respect to the generation, sale or
transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities" licensed by the
federal agency. Id. at 208. Amendments in 1959 then heightened the states' role by permitting
state programs to take over some of the federal regulatory oversight, but expressly preserved
the federal authority over regulation of construction, and operation of nuclear facilities and the
disposal of hazardous nuclear materials. See id. at 209. According to the Court, these factors
clearly indicated that Congress intended "dual regulation" of nuclear powered electricity
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of the federal interest is the key inquiry in field preemption analysis
grounded in dominant federal interest, the Court will balance the
federal interest against the state interest by considering the history of
state and federal regulation and the entire regulatory scheme.
Field preemption can also be found if the federal law provides
a sufficiently pervasive or comprehensive scheme of regulation. The
Court has emphasized that there is no exact measure for when a
scheme's comprehensiveness gives rise to the inference that Congress
intended to preclude all state regulation in a field, but case law
provides some benchmarks. In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, the Court held that the congressional statutes
and regulations governing trade with American Indians evinced
Congress's intent that the federal government should have exclusive
jurisdiction over the business of Indian trading. 7 In addition to
granting the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the exclusive power to
appoint traders and to specify the kind, quantity and prices of goods
sold to Indians, there were detailed regulations prescribing "in the
most minute fashion" who may qualify as a trader and how he shall
be licensed, as well as, inter alia,what business records must be kept
and how Indians are to be paid. The regulations also provided for
inspections and penalties for violations. The Court characterized the
regulations as "all inclusive" and held that a state tax on gross sales
of a company that did business with Indians on the Arizona part of
the Navajo reservation was preempted.88
While Warren TradingPost involved a subject which arguably
could support a finding of field preemption based on the strong federal
interest, the Court has found field preemption based on pervasive
regulation even where the federal interest was minimal. In Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, the Court addressed the preemptive scope of
generation, and that the field of exclusive federal control was limited to the regulation of the
safety and nuclear aspects of energy generation. Id. at 211-12.
87. 380 U.S. 685, 688-89 (1965).
88. See id. at 690. In Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 498-504 (1956), the Court
relied on the aggregate effect of numerous Congressional activities to support its finding that
Congress intended to occupy the field of sedition. In 1940, Congress enacted the Smith Act
which proscribed advocacy of the overthrow of federal, state, or local government and was
enforceable through general criminal conspiracy provisions. See id. at 498-99. In 1950,
Congress enacted the Internal Security Act, which required communist organizations to register
and file annual reports detailing officers and funds, imposed sanctions on the organizations and
members, and was enforceable through fines. See id. at 502-03. In 1954, the Communist
Control Act characterized the Communist political party as a conspiracy to overthrow the
government and within the scope of the Internal Security Act. See id. at 503. The Court held a
state sedition statute preempted because these acts, taken as a whole, evinced a plan which
made "it reasonable to determine that no room ha[d] been left for the States to supplement it."
Id. at 504.
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extensive federal regulations governing the manufacture of butter.89
Notably, while the process of manufacturing a product such as butter
is important to consumers and workers, the federal interest in the
subject does not rise to the level of the federal interest in foreign
affairs, national security, nuclear safety or dealing with American
Indians. Nonetheless, the Court held that the federal regulations
precluded further state regulation in the field. The Court noted that
the Department of Agriculture had been given authority to protect
consumers' interests "throughout the process of manufacture and
distribution" and that the Department had regulated "such minutiae
as the clean hands of the employees and the elimination of objectionable odors."90 Thus, the pervasive nature of the regulatory scheme
alone justified a finding of preemption.
If a court finds that Congress intended to preempt a particular
field, the second step in the field preemption analysis is whether the
state law impermissibly intrudes on that field. In Pacific Gas, the
Court stated that, "[wihen the Federal Government completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it... the test of preemption is whether 'the matter on which the State asserts the right to
act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.'-91 In English v.
General Electric Co., which also involved an analysis of preemption
under the Atomic Energy Act, the Court framed the issue as whether
the state law is "so related to" the safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear facility that it falls within the
field occupied by Congress2 However, the Court limited the scope of
laws that could be preempted by noting that "not every state law that
in some remote way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by
89. 315 U.S. 148, 151 (1942).
90. Id. at 168.
91. 461 U.S. at 212-13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
Despite the test's focus on the subject matter of the regulation, in applying the test the Court
suggested that the motivation underlying the state law was central to the analysis. The Court
opined that a state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns would fall
squarely within the identified field of nuclear safety concerns. See id. at 213. Because the
Court accepted the lower court's finding that California's moratorium was motivated by
economic concerns, the Court held that the provision fell outside of the occupied field of nuclear
safety. Yet, the real basis for the Court's conclusion is unclear. In concluding its field
preemption analysis, the Court noted that an inquiry into legislative motives was
"unsatisfactory" and reiterated that it was clear that the states had been allowed to retain
sufficient authority over the need for electrical generating facilities to permit the provision at
issue. See id. at 216. In English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990), the Court
clarified that Pacific Gas should not be read for the proposition that a finding of safety
motivation was necessary to place a law within the field preempted by the AEA. Thus, although
a moratorium grounded in safety concerns would fall within the preempted field, state laws
enacted for reasons other than safety may also be preempted.
92. 496 U.S. at 84-85.

1170

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1149

those who build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within
the preempted field."93 Rather, the test was whether the state law

had "some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by
those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological
safety levels."94 The focus of this prong of the field preemption
analysis therefore devolves to whether the state law has a sufficient
impact on the federal interest to warrant preemption. 95
The other theory of implied preemption hinges on conflict with
federal law. The Supreme Court has recognized that federal laws
that do not exclude all state laws in the same field nonetheless override state laws when there is an impermissible conflict. 96 The Court
will infer the requisite intent for conflict preemption when it is
"impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements" 97 or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

93. Id.
94. Id. at 85. The state law at issue in English was a state tort claim for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff was a laboratory technician
at a nuclear facility operated by the defendant and was allegedly discharged in retaliation for
complaints to General Electric's management and the federal government about perceived violations of nuclear safety standards. The Court recognized that allowing the claim to proceed
would have some effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities
because liability for such claims "will attach additional consequences to retaliatory conduct by
employees. As employers find retaliation more costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistle-blowers by other means, including altering radiological safety policies." Id.
Nonetheless, the Court held that such an effect was not sufficiently direct or substantial
enough to fall within the scope of the preempted field. The Court bolstered its finding by
analogizing to Silkwood v.Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984), in which the Court held
that a state tort claim for punitive damages arising out of an escape of plutonium from a
federally licensed nuclear facility did not fall within the field preempted by the AEA. The Court
explained that the state tort claim in Silkwood would attach additional consequences to safety
violations themselves and, therefore, allowing it to proceed would have a more direct effect on
safety decisions. See English, 496 U.S. at 86. Logically, then, a state tort claim imposing a less
direct effect would not fall within the preempted field. See id.
95. The cases also show that the Court has, in some instances, used a balancing approach
when determining whether certain state laws fall within an identified field subject to exclusive
federal regulation. Despite its early broad findings that federal statutes and regulations evince
a congressional intent that no room remains for state regulation of the business of Indian
trading on reservations, the Court has upheld some state laws that affect the business of Indian
trading. See, e.g., Washington v. Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1979); Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976). In Department of Taxation & Finance v.
Milhelm Attea & Brothers., Inc., the Court explained that the preemption issue depends on a
"particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law." 512 U.S. 61, 73 (1994) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 145 (1980)).
96. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525-26 (1977).
97. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)).
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Congress."9 8 Cases where it is impossible to comply with both federal
and state laws are the easy preemption cases which generate no real
controversy.9
In contrast, preemption merely because a state law may frustrate congressional goals involves a more complex analysis and has
generated more controversy. Whether a state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress... requires [an analysis of] the relationship
between the state and federal law as they are interpreted and applied." 1 0 In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., the Court addressed whether
a California law that prohibited the average weight of packages at the
time of sale from being less than the net weight stated on the package
was preempted by federal laws regulating net weight labeling. 10 The
Court found that the federal law impliedly preempted the state law
because, although the flour millers could physically comply with both
laws, they could not do so without hindering what the Court found to
2
be an important purpose underlying the federal labeling laws.10
Specifically, the federal laws in Jones required accurate labeling of the quantity of contents in a package, but permitted reasonable
weight variations caused by loss or gain of moisture during the course
of reasonable distribution methods. 0 3 The Court explained that a
major purpose of the federal law was to facilitate value comparisons
among similar products, which requires that packages bearing the
same weight on the label in fact contain the same quantity of the
product.' °4 Under the federal law, although a change in moisture
might impact the weight of the packages, the packages would contain
as
the same amount of flour solids when they reach the consumer
10 5
comparisons.
product
facilitating
thereby
when they were packed,
In contrast, the state law's prohibition on weight variations
would have a different effect. Flour millers would have to make ac-

98. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
99. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (1995)
(explaining that, if a federal statute forbids an act that state legislation requires, the federal law
preempts the state law).
100. Jones, 430 U.S. at 526 (quotingHines, 312 U.S. at 67).
101. Id.
102. See id at 540-41.
103. Id. at 533-34 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1.8b(q) (1976)).
104. See id. at 540-41.
105. A change in moisture might impact the weight because after milling and packaging
the moisture content of flour does not remain constant: flour will absorb moisture if stored
where the relative humidity is greater than sixty percent, and will lose moisture if the humidity
is less than sixty percent. See id. at 541 & n.36.
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commodations for possible weight changes that may occur before sale.
While local millers could possibly adjust their packaging to the specific humidity conditions of a region, a national miller would have to
prepare for any potential weight loss and would have to over-pack to
ensure that the actual weight was not less than the label weight.'06
This could lead to some packages having a different amount of flour
solids than others despite identical weight labels. Because consumers' product value comparisons would be hindered, the Court held
that the state law was preempted.1°7 Jones represents a traditional
approach to the implied theories because preemption was premised on
a finding of actual hindrance of the key federal purpose underlying
the federal legislation.
In some cases, however, the Court has gone further and invalidated state laws even though compliance with the laws would
seemingly further the federal goals. For example, in Gade v. National
Solid Wastes ManagementAss'n, the Court held that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") preempted Illinois' legislative
provisions for the licensure of certain hazardous waste equipment
operators and laborers108 The state law required an applicant to
undergo rigorous training. 0 9 The federal agency charged with the
responsibility for establishing federal safety and health standards
under OSHA also promulgated detailed regulations on training
requirements for those working with hazardous materials. Generally,
a worker had to receive a minimum of forty hours of instruction and
three days actual field experience under a supervisor. 10 A trade
association of businesses that transport, dispose, and handle
hazardous waste materials challenged the state laws because some
members of the association had to ensure that their workers received
not only the three days of field experience required by OSHA, but also
the 500 days required by Illinois."' Gade is thus distinguishable from
Jones because the affected entities could physically comply with both
laws and because compliance with the state law would not hinder the
underlying federal objective of promoting worker health and safety.

106. See id. at 542-43.
107. See id. at 543.
108. 505 U.S. 88, 108-09 (1992).
109. For example, the applicant was required to provide a record of at least forty hours of
approved training, to pass an examination, and to complete an annual refresher course.
Further, a hazardous waste crane operator's license required a record showing operation of
equipment for a minimum of 4,000 hours (500 days). See id. at 93 (citing 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
22015(c)-(e), 22016(c)-(d), 22017(b), 22115(c), 22116 (West 1998)).
110. See id. at 92-93 (citing 29 CFR § 1910.120(e)(3)(i) (1997)).
111. See id. at 93-94.
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Indeed, the state provisions would enhance safety because those
satisfying the Illinois requirements would be better skilled and thus
would be likely to have fewer accidents.112
Nonetheless, a plurality of the Court in Gade held that the
state laws were impliedly preempted. In part, the decision hinged on
an express provision in OSHA which, although not a preemption
clause, strongly suggested that Congress intended for state laws to be
preempted if the state law established an occupational standard on an
issue for which the federal agency had established a standard, unless
the state obtained the agency's approval."' The Court was also
influenced by the Act's savings clause, which exempts from
preemption any state laws regulating an occupational health and
safety issue if no federal standard is in effect.14 The Court found that
these provisions evidenced Congress's intent to preempt state laws
regulating the same issues as federal laws, even if they merely
supplemented, and thus promoted, the policy underlying the federal
standard."m
However, preemption hinged in large part on a secondary
purpose underlying the Act identified by the Court: a congressional
intent to avoid subjecting workers and employers to duplicative regulation.116 Although the state had emphasized that the laws were
designed to promote worker safety, the Court held that:
In determining whether state law 'stands as an obstacle' to the full implementation of a federal law, 'it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both

federal and state law' is the same... 'A state law also is pre-empted if it

112. See id. at 94-95 (explaining the district court's findings).
113. Section 18(b) of OSHA provides:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and
enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been
promulgated... shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and
their enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1994). Although not a "preemption clause," Justice Kennedy would have
characterized the case as one of express preemption. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
114. Section 4(bX4) of OSHA states that the Act does not "supersede or in any manner
affect any workmen's compensation law or... enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner
the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994).
115. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100.
116. See id.
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interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach
117
th[at] goal."

Thus, preemption was deemed appropriate because allowing states to
selectively "'supplement' certain federal regulations with ostensibly
nonconflicting standards .would be inconsistent with th[e] federal
scheme of establishing uniform federal standards."118 A state law can

therefore be preempted as frustrating federal law if the effect of the
state law hinders either the primary substantive purpose underlying
the federal law or the secondary purpose of avoiding duplicative
regulation. 119
Notably, identification of a federal purpose of "uniform" regulation in essence converts the situation from one of conflict preemption
to one of field preemption. The Supreme Court has recognized this
relationship between the frustration prong of conflict preemption and
field preemption. Despite its "stands as an obstacle" analysis, the
Court in Gade shifted to a field preemption analysis when addressing
the state's argument that the law was not preempted because, although the law concerned an occupational standard, the law also
addressed a public safety concern. 20 The Court rejected this argument and noted that the preemption analysis must focus on both the
law's purpose and effect.21 The key issue is "at what point the state
regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should
be deemed preempted under the Act." 22 Relying on the "direct and

substantial effect" test from English-developed in the field
preemption context-the Court agreed that, notwithstanding the
117. Id. at 103 (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
118. Id.

119. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy characterized OSHA's primary objectives as
the protection of worker safety and health; thus, Congress's desire to "'subject employers and
employees to only one set of regulations'" would be a secondary objective. Id. at 110 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). Kennedy then disagreed that primary and secondary pur-

poses should have the same preemptive implications. Justice Kennedy opined that implied
conflict preemption should be "limited to state laws which impose prohibitions or obligations
which are in direct contradiction to Congress's primary objectives, as conveyed with clarity in

the federal legislation." Id. Kennedy viewed the protection of worker health and safety to be
the Act's primary purpose, but did not believe that Congress's purpose to subject employers and
employees to only one set of regulations rose to that level. See id. Kennedy agreed with the
outcome, but viewed the case as one of express preemption rather than implied preemption
because the implication was largely derived from specific provisions in the Act. Id.
120. According to the State, because the state legislature articulated a purpose other than
workplace health and safety, the Act had lost its preemptive force. The Court framed the issue
as whether a "dual impact law can be an 'occupational safety and health standard' subject to
pre-emption." Id. at 104-05.
121. See id. at 105.
122. Id. at 107.
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motivation for the state law, the Act preempted state law that
"constitutes, in a direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of
worker health and safety."'2
The slippery path between the
frustration prong of conflict preemption and field preemption
reinforces the view that the three categories of implied preemption
are not "rigidly distinct."124
Perhaps more importantly for purposes of this Article, the
Gade opinion suggests that the line between express and implied
preemption may be equally blurry. As explained, a plurality of the
Justices found the state training requirements to be impliedly preempted. The plurality analysis, however, focused predominantly on
OSHA's text. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy would have characterized
the case as one of express preemption. 125 The plurality acknowledged
the validity of Kennedy's observation, but concluded that the text's
strong indication of Congress's intent that federal standards would
preempt non-approved state standards on the same issues did not rise
to the level of express preemption.126 'Ve cannot agree that the
negative implications
of the text, although
ultimately
dispositive... expressly address the issue of federal pre-emption of
state law."127 Interestingly, the Court then stated:
Frequently the pre-emptive label' we choose will carry with it substantive
implications for the scope of pre-emption. In this case, however, it does not.
Our disagreement with Justice Kennedy as to whether [OSHA's] pre-emptive
effect is labeled 'express' or 'implied' is less important than our agreement that
the implications of the text of the statute evince a congressional intent to pre28

empt nonapproved state regulations when a federal standard is in effect.

Thus, after reinforcing that there was in fact a distinction between
implied and express preemption, the Court nonetheless noted that the

123. Id. Similarly, the dissenting Justices in Gade equated the frustration prong of conflict
analysis to field preemption where one congressional purpose is to avoid duplicative regulations.

Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas noted that:

under the plurality's reading, any regulation on an issue as to which a federal standard
has been promulgated has been pre-empted. As one commentator has observed, this
kind of purpose-conflict pre-emption, which occurs when state law is held to
'undermin[e] a congressional decision in favor of national uniformity of standards,'
presents 'a situation similar in practical effect to that of federal occupation of the field.'

Id. at 115-16 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at

486).
124. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
125. See id. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 104 n.2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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label of express or implied preemption was unimportant to its deci29

sion.1

2. The Express Preemption Analysis
As with implied preemption, the Court has emphasized in
express preemption cases that whether federal law supersedes state
law is fundamentally a question of congressional intent. As to express
preemption, the Court has often stated that, because Congress has
revealed its intent through explicit statutory language, "the court's
task is an easy one."130 Given the number of cases addressed by the
Supreme Court involving express preemption provisions, and the
number of plurality opinions spawned, s ' it is clear that express

preemption provisions have failed to make the task an easy one.
As noted earlier in Part II, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
the Court reinforced the notion that express and implied preemption
analyses are distinct.13 2 In Cipollone, the Court addressed whether
the express preemption provisions in the federal laws regulating
cigarette labeling preempted state common law claims for breach of
warranty, failure to warn, and misrepresentation.
The Court
explained that the preemptive scope of the federal laws was governed
entirely by the express language of those provisions. The preemption
provision prescribed that "[no requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter."133 The
cigarette manufacturers argued that the claims were not preempted
because common law claims do not impose "requirements or prohibitions." The Court disagreed, noting that the argument was at
odds with the plain words of the 1969 provision: "[t]he phrase '[n]o
requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law...

."134

The pre-

129. Id.
130. Id. at 79.
131. See. e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S.470, 474, 503, 509 (1996); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992); cf American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219, 234-50 (1995) (although not a plurality opinion, revealing a serious disagreement among
the Justices as to the scope of an express preemption provision).
132. 505 U.S. 504,514(1992).
133. Id. at 515 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
134. Id. at 521. Although the Court agreed that the legislative history suggested that
Congress was primarily concerned with positive enactments by states, "the language of the Act
plainly reaches beyond such enactments" because "itis difficult to say that such actions do not
impose 'requirements or prohibitions.' "Id. at 521-22.
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emption analysis of the plaintiffs claims therefore hinged on whether
each was "based on smoking and health," and imposed with respect to
"advertising or promotion." Thus, the Court focused on the precise
words of the preemption clause when analyzing the scope of an express preemption provision.
However, in some cases, the language of an express preemption provision has not been the sole consideration in express preemption analysis. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court addressed
whether the Medical Devices Act ("MDA") preempted common law
negligence and strict liability claims against manufacturers of medical devices.'35 The MDA's preemption provision provides that states
may not establish any "requirement" which differs from or adds to
any requirement applicable under the MDA, and which relates to the
"safety or effectiveness of the device." 13 6 Following Cipollone, the
Court in Medtronic explained that it was unnecessary to go beyond
the text of the provision to determine whether Congress intended to
preempt "at least some state law.""31 However, the Court clarified
that it must "nonetheless 'identify the domain expressly pre-empted'
by that language."138 The Court explained that this analysis, while
beginning with the text and the presumption against preemption,
must ultimately strive to ascertain Congress's purpose. 139 The Court
also stated that a fair understanding of congressional purpose is
discerned not only from the language of the preemption provisions,
but also from the statutory framework surrounding it, and the
structure and purpose of the entire statute as revealed "through the
reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which
Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme
to affect business, consumers, and the law." 40
The defendant in Medtronic argued that the plaintiffs claims
were preempted because any common law cause of action constitutes
a "requirement" which alters incentives or imposes duties different
from or in addition to the standards promulgated pursuant to the
MDA. Although the Court in Cipollone adopted a similar argument, a
plurality of the Court in Medtronic deemed the argument implausible.
The Court found it "'difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse' for those injured"
135. 518 U.S. 470,474 (1996).
136. Id. at 484 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 484.
Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
See id.
Id. at 486.
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from defective medical devices.' 4' According to the Court, this would
have the "perverse effect" of granting immunity from design defect
liability to an industry that Congress thought needed more stringent
safety regulation. The plurality distinguished Cipollone as involving
a more specific preemption provision targeted at a limited set of state
requirements based on smoking and health. Thus, "giving the term
'requirement' its widest reasonable meaning did not have nearly the
pre-emptive scope nor the effect on potential remedies that
42
Medtronic's broad reading of the term would have in this suit."
Therefore, although conducting an express preemption analysis, the
Court tempered the plain meaning of the terms in the preemption
clause.'43
These cases suggest that in express preemption analysis, the
key underlying inquiry is whether the state law constitutes the type
of law described in the preemption provision. In making this determination, the language of the preemption provision carries substantial weight. But the Court may look beyond that language, to the
purpose of the federal law as revealed through the statutory framework, to ensure that its interpretation is a fair assessment of
Congress's intent regarding the scope of preemption. The inquiry
then becomes whether, given the purpose of the federal scheme, it
makes sense to construe the language of the preemption clause as
encompassing the particular state law at issue.
Once the Court moves beyond the language of the provision,
the analysis takes on some of the characteristics of implied preemption analysis. Yet, the majority or plurality opinions in express preemption cases do not suggest that the Court is conducting an implied
preemption analysis despite recent suggestions in concurring opinions
that it makes sense to use the implied preemption doctrines to aid in
the interpretation of express preemption clauses. The question, then,
becomes whether the express preemption analysis really differs from
141. Id. at 487 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 238 (1984)).
142. Id. at 488.

143. Yet, Medtronic reflects a textual approach to the analysis. The plurality relied on the
structure and purpose of the statute as a whole. The Court pointed out that, in the MDA, the
term "requirement" appears several times, each time suggesting that its focus is specific enactments of positive law. See id. at 487-88. Additionally, the Court found that the MDA was primarily enacted to "provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for
human use." Id. at 489-90. Therefore, the Court found that, although Congress may have had

some intent to protect innovations in device technology, Congress's primary concerns about
regulatory burdens were related to the risk of additional federal and state regulation rather

than the danger of preexisting duties under the common law. Indeed, the Court opined that any
concern that product liability actions would hamper the development of devices was manifested
through fewer substantive requirements under the MDA. See id. at 491.
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an implied preemption analysis. A careful analysis supports the
conclusion that there is no substantive difference between implied
and express preemption analysis.
3. A Metaphysical and Illusory Distinction
The foregoing descriptions illustrate that, when Congress has
used its delegated powers and enacted legislation, the question of
preemption becomes one of statutory interpretation. The cases involving an express preemption clause readily reveal the interpretative
nature of the preemption analysis. The Court has focused on the
precise language of the preemption clause, and whether the state law
constitutes the type of law described in the preemption provision. In
making this determination, the language of the preemption provision
is assigned substantial and sometimes determinative weight.
However, in some cases, the Court may look beyond that language to
the purpose of the federal law as revealed through the statutory
framework. The inquiry in these cases then becomes whether, given
the structure and purpose of the federal scheme, it makes sense to
construe the language as encompassing the particular state law at
issue.
Although implied preemption cases are also matters of statutory interpretation, no specific preemption language guides the
analysis. Rather, the analysis focuses on more abstract concepts such
as the weight of the federal interest, the pervasiveness of the
regulatory scheme, or the purposes underlying the federal legislative
action. The analysis in both field preemption and conflict preemption
cases depends on the effect of the state law on the federal scheme.
Namely, does the law have a direct and substantial effect on the subject matter preserved for federal regulation and thus constitute a law
which impermissibly intrudes on the preemptive field? Or, does the
effect of the law frustrate congressional purposes by rendering it
impossible to comply with both or by being sufficiently in tension with
the federal purposes? Without specific preemption language, identification of a field preserved for exclusive federal regulation and the
federal purposes underlying federal law must be inferred.
But what, if any, is the difference between looking to the language, structure and purpose of the federal law in express preemption
analysis to ensure a fair assessment of congressional intent and inferring intent to preempt from the weight of the federal interest, the
pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, or the purposes underlying
the federal law? In the Gade decision, Justice Kennedy alluded to a
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distinction when he objected to an inquiry that permitted a court to
infer an intent to preempt by assessing whether the state law was in
tension with the objectives of the federal law. According to Kennedy,
"[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in
tension with federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is
Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law."1' Yet,
Kennedy endorsed the express preemption analysis which purports to
divine Congress's intent from the language, structure, and purposes of
the statute as a whole. 145 Thus, although both express and implied
analyses look to the purpose of the federal law, Justice Kennedy
noticed a critical difference between them. 46 In the express
preemption analysis, a court determines the purpose of the statute
and asks, given this purpose, as divined from the text, is it reasonable
to infer that Congress intended the preemption clause to encompass
this state law? But, in the implied "stands as an obstacle" analysis, a
court asks a very different question: Is the state law sufficiently in
tension with the federal interests or objectives that it should be
preempted?
It could be argued, then, that the implied preemption doctrines
simply sidestep the key premise underlying both express and implied
approaches, namely, that the touchstone of the analysis is congressional intent to preempt state law. Weighing the strength of the
federal interest or the pervasiveness of the federal law, or assessing
whether the effect of the state law is in tension with congressional
purposes, may provide insight into whether the federal law should
preempt the state law to ensure an effective regulatory scheme, but it
does not provide insight into congressional intent.
As one
commentator has noted, the implied preemption doctrines may cause
courts to "avoid the central question, whether Congress intended to
oust state law, and rather examine what general purposes Congress
intended its legislation to have in the subject area and consider
47
whether the state law interferes with these purposes in any way."'
In contrast, even when the Court has looked beyond the language of

144. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992). Many
scholars agree with this view. See, e.g., Philip H. Corby & Todd A. Smith, FederalPreemptionof
Product Liability Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AMER. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 435,444-50 (1992).
145. Kennedy agreed with the outcome, but viewed the case as one of express preemption
rather than implied preemption because the implication was largely derived from specific provisions in the Act. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. See id. at 109-10.
147. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS L.Q. 69,
96 (1988).

1998]

PREEMPTIONPARADIGM

1181

the provision and considered the federal law's structure and purpose,
the express preemption approach appears to remain truer to
preemption's premise. 148 When the Court analyzes the structure of
the federal law, the Court is attempting to ascertain congressional
intent from the terms of the statute as a whole. When the Court
considers the statute's purpose, the focus remains on whether, given
the effect of the state law on the federal purpose, it is reasonable to
infer that Congress intended for this type of state law to fall within
the scope of the preemptive language.
This distinction, however, is metaphysical if not illusory. In
both instances the Court engages in statutory construction. The
difference is that the implied theories represent a more purposive, or
contextual, approach to statutory interpretation. As explained in
greater detail in Part IV, a court using a purposive approach will
consider numerous sources and factors to ensure that its interpretation gives effect to the spirit of the law, fits the law into the legal
landscape, and remains consistent with overarching policies. In
contrast, the express preemption analysis reflects a classic textual
approach to statutory interpretation. A court using a textual approach will avoid looking beyond the text of the statute at issue, and
will interpret the law in accord with the meaning attributable to the
words used by Congress-even if a review of other material would
show that the legislature could not have intended what the meaning
suggests. 149 Both approaches, however, represent a search for congressional intent. 50
If the distinction stems predominantly from different approaches to statutory interpretation, the Justices' hesitancy to integrate the implied theories into cases involving express preemption
clauses is unwarranted-at least from a doctrinal perspective. The
hesitancy is perhaps understandable, however, given the growing
debate as to the proper approach to statutory interpretation.
Nonetheless, rather than avoiding the issues, the Court should confront the complex conceptual and interpretive issues which arise as
the preemption paradigm shifts away from the traditional categorical
148. The discussion in Part IV demonstrates the fallacy of this statement.
149. See infra notes 285-309 and accompanying text.
150. Notably, Justice Scalia, an avid proponent of textualism, would qualify the statement
that statutory interpretation represents a search for congressional intent. Scalia has explained
that, although the Court frequently states that the objective in interpreting a statute is to give
effect to "the intent of the legislature," judges are not looking for subjective intent, but for an
"objectified intent." Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: - The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 16-17 (1997).
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approach. The remainder of this Article explores these difficult issues.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
As the Court shifts away from the categorical approach to
preemption and toward a preemption continuum in which the implied
theories inform an express preemption analysis, key issues which
arise are when the implied theories are relevant and how they should
be used. These questions delve into the conceptual difficulty associated with integrating the doctrines. For example, should the implied
theories be viewed as merely another means of defining the scope of
the terms in the express preemption clause? Or, should the theories
be used as a supplemental means of finding state laws
preempted-beyond the scope of the express preemption clause, and
perhaps beyond the direct operation of the Supremacy Clause? As
noted in Part I, the majority in Boggs expressly declined to address
the conceptual issue. 151 This Part analyzes the ramifications of the
Court's avoidance of the issues and finds that the majority opinion
represents a doctrinal "leap" to the use of the implied preemption
theories. However, in order to facilitate the discussion of both the
conceptual and interpretive issues, this Part first provides relevant
background information about Boggs.
A. The Boggs Case-Background
Boggs is a complex case both factually and legally. Isaac Boggs
worked for South Central Bell ("SCB") and participated in SCB's retirement plan from 1949 until his retirement in 1985.152 When Isaac

began employment with SCB he was married to Dorothy. They remained married until Dorothy's death in 1979. Thus, Isaac and
Dorothy were married for approximately thirty of the thirty-six years
in which Isaac participated in SCB's retirement plan. They had three
sons. Dorothy's will bequeathed to Isaac one-third of her estate; the
remaining two-thirds was bequeathed to Isaac as a lifetime usufruct,
with naked ownership interest being held by her sons. 153 For purposes

151. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997).
152. See id. The basic facts of the case, as explained in this subpart, are found in section I
of the majority opinion. See id. at 1758-59.
153. Under Louisiana law, a "lifetime usufruct" is the equivalent of a common law life
estate. See id. at 1758 (citing LA. Crv. CODE ANN., art. 535 (West 1980)). The "naked owner-
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of the litigation, the parties agreed that, under Louisiana's
community property laws, Dorothy could dispose of her community
property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan.M
Within a year of Dorothy's death, Isaac married Sandra and
they remained married until Isaac's death in 1989. When Isaac retired from SCB in 1985, he received numerous benefits: a lump sum
155
distribution from SCB's savings plan which he rolled into an IRA;

ninety-six shares of AT&T stock; and a monthly annuity payment in
the amount of $1,777.67. Isaac bequeathed to Sandra certain real
property including the family home, and a lifetime usufruct in the remainder of his estate with naked ownership interest being held by his
sons.156
The dispute arose when Dorothy and Isaac's sons filed an action in state court asking that the court appoint an expert to compute
the percentage of the retirement benefits they were entitled to as a
result of Dorothy's testamentary transfer. 157 From the sons' perspective, Dorothy's testamentary transfer of her community property
interest in Isaac's retirement plan impacted Isaac's ability to bequeath the retirement benefits to Sandra at the time of his death.
One part of the retirement benefits represented Isaac's community
interest in the retirement benefits which Isaac could leave to Sandra.
A second part represented the one-third of the benefits which constituted Dorothy's community interest, which she unconditionally left to
Isaac and which Isaac could thus leave to Sandra. However, a third
part represented the remaining two-thirds of the benefits which constituted Dorothy's community interest which she left to Isaac as a
lifetime usufruct. Thus, if Dorothy's testamentary transfer was valid,
the sons-as owners of the naked interest in this portion of the benefits-were entitled to some portion of the benefits at the time of
Isaac's death. The sons sought a judgment awarding them their portion of the benefits, including a portion of the IRA, the AT&T stock,

ship" held by the sons is the equivalent of a common law remainder interest. See id. at 1767
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Shortly after Dorothy's death, a Louisiana state court ascribed to Dorothy's estate a
community property interest in Isaac's savings plan retirement account in the amount of
$21,194.29. See id. at 1758.
155. The lump sum distribution was in the amount of $151,628.94. Because Isaac made no
withdrawals, the IRA acount was valued at $180,778.05 when he died. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89
F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1758.
157. See id. at 1759.
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the monthly annuity payments received by Isaac during his retirement, and Sandra's survivor annuity payments. 158
Sandra challenged the sons' claim to any portion of the retirement benefits by raising the sword of ERISA preemption. 159 It was
undisputed that Isaac's retirement benefits were provided by SCB as
part of an employee benefit plan within the scope of ERISA. Thus,
Sandra filed a complaint in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted the application of Louisiana's community property and succession laws to the extent that the laws would
validate the sons' claim to an interest in Isaac's retirement benefits.160
The district court held that ERISA did not preempt the state laws and
a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 6'
The Boggs majority in the Supreme Court found that
Louisiana's community property law was preempted to the extent it
recognized Dorothy's sons' claims because of a conflict with two
ERISA provisions. One ERISA provision mandates that annuity
benefits payable upon retirement must be in the form of a joint and
survivor annuity that includes an annuity payable to a nonparticipant
surviving spouse. 162 The other provision is an exception to the general
prohibition on alienation of ERISA benefits that permits a court to
issue a decree creating or recognizing a nonparticipant spouse's rights
to benefits when resolving marital property rights upon divorce or
separation. 63 As to both provisions, the majority found that permitting the sons' action to proceed would frustrate Congress's
purpose. The Court grounded its conclusion on a "stands as an

158. The dissenting opinion clarified that, in Sandra's words, the sons asked for "'an undivided interest in, and/or the value of an undivided interest in, the assets and/or benefits that
were paid out of the pension plans.'" Id. at 1768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This distinction
became relevant in the dissent's analysis of the survivor's annuity provision. See id. at 1774-75.
159. See id. at 1759. ERISA contains an express preemption clause which broadly provides
that "the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they... relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
160. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1759.
161. See id. The lower courts held that ERISA did not preempt Dorothy's transfer because
Congress did not intend to affect traditional family law. Further, ERISA provisions were not
implicated because Dorothy's rights in the benefits were acquired by operation of community
property law and not by a transfer, and because "'[ERISA] does not display any particular
interest in preserving maximum benefits to any particular beneficiary.'" Id. at 1759 (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Fifth Circuit opinion created a
split in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and because the decision affected the community property
states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington. See id.
162. See id. at 1761-62; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994). See also infra note 204 for a
more detailed discussion of section 1055(a).
163. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1762-63. The anti-alienation provision is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995). The provision expressly permitting qualified domestic relations
orders is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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obstacle" theory of implied preemption.164 The dissenting Justices in
Boggs disagreed with the outcome, but agreed that the "stands as an
obstacle" theory of preemption was relevant to the analysis.165 The
Court's reliance on the implied "stands as an obstacle" theory in a
case involving ERISA, which contains an express preemption
provision, is significant because it confirms the evolving view that the
implied theories of preemption may inform an express preemption
analysis.
However, the majority declined to explain, from a
conceptual perspective, how the implied "stands as an obstacle"
theory related to ERISA's express preemption clause.166
B. ERISA Preemption-Traditionallyan Express
PreemptionAnalysis
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 and included in it a preemption provision infamous for its breadth. 167 Section 514(a) of ERISA
broadly proclaims that "the provisions of this subchapter.., shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they.., relate to any
employee benefit plan."168 Employee benefit plans are defined to
include both pension and welfare plans.169 The Supreme Court has
historically construed section 514(a) as broadly encompassing all state
laws that have a "connection with or reference to" ERISA plans; but
as not reaching state laws with only a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" effect on plans.170 These parameters of ERISA preemption
were established through the approach to express preemption analysis explained in Part II. Indeed, the early ERISA cases were among
the first cases decided by the Supreme Court involving an express
preemption provision.
The Court first articulated the "connection with or reference
to" standard in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.Y71 Citing to Black's Law
Dictionary,the Court held that a law" 'relates to' an employee benefit

164. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1763-64; see also infra Part IV.A.1.

165. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.A.2.
166. See id. at 1760-61.
167. For an in-depth analysis of ERISA's preemption clause, see Karen A. Jordan,
Travelers Insurance: New Support for Arguments to Restrain the Scope of ERISA Preemption,
13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994).
170. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
171. Id. Shaw involved a challenge to two New York laws: a law prohibiting employers
from structuring their benefit plans such that pregnancy was treated differently from other nonoccupational disabilities; and a law requiring employers to pay disability benefits to employees
unable to work because of pregnancy.
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plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan."172 The Court noted that it must give effect
to the "plain meaning" of the phrase "unless there is good reason to
believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive
meaning."173 The Court looked briefly to the structure of ERISA's
preemption provisions and to the legislative history to confirm that
Congress used the phrase "relate to" in its broad sense; and it then
reinforced the breadth of its interpretation by relegating to a footnote
the possibility of any limitation on the scope of the phrase. 7 4 Shaw,
therefore, set the stage for express preemption analysis in ERISA
preemption cases.
Following Shaw, the inquiry into whether ERISA preempts
state law has traditionally begun with the Court's dictionary definition of the phrase "relate to," "connection with," or "reference to," and
then proceeded to an analysis of whether the challenged state law
falls within the scope of this phrase. 175 As noted in Part II, the Court
recently has suggested that the scope of ERISA preemption cannot be
determined solely by reference to the phrase "relate to," but must turn
in part on the congressional purposes underlying ERISA.176
Importantly, however, the Court in these recent cases did not explicitly employ the implied preemption doctrines. Rather, the Court
retained the "connection with or reference to" benchmark, thereby
suggesting that the Court was still, in essence, engaging in an express
preemption analysis, albeit one which required further refinement of
what those terms meant. 77
172. Id. at 96-97 & n.16 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1288 (6th ed. 1990): "Relate. To

stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with").
173. Id. at 97 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980)).
174. See id. at 98-100 & n.21.
175. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 468 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. v. DeDeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
176. See, e.g., DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct.
1747 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. Inc., 519
U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
177. For example, the Court in Travelers found that the state law at issue did not involve
an impermissible "reference to" ERISA plans, and held that the state law had an insufficient
"connection with" ERISA plans because it did not bind ERISA plan administrators to any particular choice nor preclude uniform administrative practices or the provision of uniform interstate benefit packages. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 61. In Dillingham, the Court held that a state
law has an impermissible "reference to" ERISA plans when the law "acts immediately and
exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey, or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential
to the law's operation...." Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 838.
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Thus, even in the recent cases, the Court appeared to follow
the approach to express preemption described in Part II. Although
looking beyond the text of the preemption provision, the inquiry was
still whether, given the structure and purpose of ERISA, it made
sense to construe the phrase "relate to" as encompassing the
particular state law at issue. The majority's use of an implied analysis in Boggs therefore presented a significant analytical shift.
However, the majority failed to address squarely the conceptual issue
of when and how the implied doctrines should be used in cases involving express preemption provisions. Unfortunately, avoiding the conceptual quagmire has arguably created a doctrinal leap rather than a
mere analytical shift.
C. The Majority's Doctrinal"Leap"to the Use of Implied Theories
Despite the Court's previous adherence to an express preemption analysis in the ERISA context, the majority in Boggs resolved the
case using an implied preemption analysis. This shift in analysis is
neither remarkable nor unexpected given the Court's recent dialogue
about the providence of looking to the implied doctrines to inform the
analysis in cases involving express preemption provisions, as well as
the concurring Justices' statements in Dillingham.178 Further, unlike
most ERISA preemption cases reaching the Supreme Court, Sandra
Boggs argued that permitting Dorothy's sons' claims to go forward
conflicted with certain express ERISA directives, 179 thereby readily
setting the stage for the integration of the implied theories into the
ERISA preemption analysis.18°
It is remarkable, however, that the majority explicitly declined
to address the conceptual issues underlying the preemption paradigm
shift. The majority in Boggs understood that questions had arisen as
to when and how to incorporate the implied theories into an analysis
involving an express provision. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy simply
began the preemption analysis by quoting ERISA's express
preemption provision, and stating:

178. See supranotes 64-68 and accompanying text.
179 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997).

180. In most other ERISA preemption cases, the parties had not argued that the state laws
at issue conflicted with any particular ERISA provision. Rather, the parties generally argued
that the state laws had an impermissible effect on ERISA plans. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at
648-49 (involving a state law imposing surcharges on hospital bills which, in turn, arguably
affected ERISA plans by increasing the costs associated with providing benefits); Pilot Life, 481
U.S. at 54 (involving state contract and tort claims which, if allowed to proceed, would arguably
affect ERISA plans by increasing the costs associated with providing benefits).
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We can begin, and in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if state law
conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects. We
hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve the case. We need not

inquire whether the statutory phrase 'relate to' provides further and additional
support for the pre-emption claim. Nor need we consider the applicability of
field pre-emption.' 8 1

The majority then found that Dorothy's sons' claim to any portion of
Sandra's survivor's annuity, as well as to Isaac's other retirement
benefits, was preempted because recognizing their interest would
frustrate a congressional purpose underlying specific ERISA
18 2
provisions.
By failing to explain why this case could be resolved on the
basis of the implied theories alone, and by resting its holding on the
"stands as an obstacle" theory, the Boggs majority opinion is
groundbreaking. The opinion can be construed as suggesting that,
even when Congress has spoken through an express preemption
provision, a federal statutory scheme may impliedly preempt state
laws beyond the scope of the express preemption language-and
beyond laws that would be superseded by the Supremacy Clause due
to a direct conflict. This is the opposite of what Justice Kennedy
explicitly suggested, namely, that an express clause may preempt
laws in addition to those impliedly preempted. 183 But, without an
explanation, the language is open to this broader and more
groundbreaking construction. It is more groundbreaking because
recent express preemption cases such as Cipollone and Medtronic
suggest that, when Congress has spoken on the issue of preemption,
the express preemption provision delimits the bounds of preemption
beyond the operation of the Supremacy Clause.184 Thus, while it is
traditionally accepted that Congress may expressly preempt laws
beyond those which could be found impliedly preempted, it is another
matter to suggest that laws beyond the scope of Congress's expression
nonetheless may be impliedly preempted under a "stands as an
obstacle" analysis.

181. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
182. See infra Part 1V.A.1.
183. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1760-61.

184. That is, as explained in Part H.B.2, the express preemption analysis posits that, when
Congress speaks through a preemption clause, the scope of preemption is determined by the
precise terms Congress chose to use in the clause. At the same time, it is traditionally

recognized that, through operation of the Supremacy Clause, a direct and actual conflict
between a provision in a federal legislative scheme and a state law results in the state law being
superseded by the federal provision.
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From this perspective, the majority's approach in Boggs could
be characterized as a doctrinal leap instead of a doctrinal shift.
Specifically, the opinion does not necessarily flow from the recent
ERISA cases suggesting that the implied doctrines might be relevant
to the analysis. Rather, the Court in Travelers unanimously held only
that its prior literal approach to the "relates to" language in ERISA's
preemption provision was unworkable; and that courts should look to
ERISA's objectives when determining whether a state law has a sufficient "connection with" ERISA plans. 1' The Court in both Travelers
and Dillingham did not explicitly recognize the use of the implied
theories. 1'
Further, even if the recent cases could be construed as
reflecting an "implicit" use of the implied preemption analysis, the
implied doctrines would have been used as a means of identifying the
scope of the phrase "reference to or connection with."187 Accordingly,
the Court's use of the implied doctrines would have been in accord
with the prevailing view that an express provision delimits the
bounds of preemption even if the implied doctrines are used to help
understand those bounds. The approach of the majority in Boggs
88
leaped beyond this use of the implied theories.'
This doctrinal leap was both unnecessary and overly broad. In
notable contrast to the majority opinion, the dissenting Justices in
Boggs confronted the conceptual issue and attempted to explore how

185. The Court in Travelers found that the state law at issue did not involve an impermissible "reference to" ERISA plans, and held that the state law had an insufficient "connection
with" ERISA plans because it did not bind ERISA plan administrators to any particular choice
nor preclude uniform administrative practices or the provision of uniform interstate benefit
packages. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
186. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 177.
188. The majority's approach, however, is arguably not unprecedented. In Alessi v.
Raybestos.Manhattan,Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-26 (1981), the first ERISA preemption case to
reach the Supreme Court, the Court held that a state law was preempted-not on the basis of
an analysis of the language of section 514(a)-but due to a conflict with specific ERISA provisions. At issue in Alessi was a state law which prohibited the set-off of workers' compensation
awards against employees' retirement benefits. Id. at 507-08 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 34:15-29
(West Supp. 1980-81)). The Court found that Congress, in enacting ERISA, expressly preserved
the option of integrating pension funds with other income streams available to the retired
employee, although Congress imposed a restriction on integration of pension benefits with
benefits available under the Social Security Act and the Railway Retirement Act. See id. at 51415.
Further, although ERISA does not expressly mention integration with workers'
compensation, the Court found that Congress had embraced an Internal Revenue Service
regulation and Revenue ruling which approved of reduction in pension benefits corresponding to
workers' compensation awards. The Court held that the state law was preempted because it
eliminated a method for calculating benefits that was permitted by federal law and thus constituted an impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme. See id. at 524-25. Thus,
Alessi arguably supports an approach which views the implied doctrines-including the "stands
as an obstacle" theory-as coexisting with an express preemption provision.
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the implied preemption doctrines should be used in a case involving
an express preemption provision. 189 Specifically, Justice Breyer
integrated the implied doctrines into the doctrinal framework developed in prior ERISA preemption cases. Justice Breyer explained that
Louisiana's community property law "relates to" an ERISA plan if it
"'refers' to such a plan, or if it has an impermissible 'connection with'
a plan."1s° Breyer first found that the law did not involve an impermissible reference by applying the test articulated in Dillingham.9 1
Justice Breyer then incorporated the implied doctrines into the
"connection with" prong of the ERISA preemption analysis. Breyer
opined that the phrase "connection with" might "encompass the question whether state law intrudes into an area Congress (given ERISA's
basic objectives) would have wanted to reserve exclusively for federal
legislation. In my view, this latter problem (sometimes called 'field
preemption') is not present here."192 Justice Breyer considered some
possible "fields" which could be implied from ERISA, but found none
that might be implicated by the state law at issue. 193 Justice Breyer
also noted that the "connection with" prong could refer to a conflict
with an ERISA purpose. 94 The heart of the dissenting opinion is thus
devoted to a conflict analysis, as is detailed in the following section.
The key point is that the dissenting opinion in Boggs confronted the
task avoided by the majority.

189. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1769-71 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1769 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. Breyer found that the community property law neither acts exclusively on nor relies
on the existence of ERISA plans. See id. at 1771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1769-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 1770 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's finding flowed from the fact
that the state law in question "involve[d] family, property and probate-all areas of traditional,
and important, state concern." Id. Justice Breyer explained:
Obviously, Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state laws that govern property
ownership. After all, someone must own an interest in ERISA plan benefits. Nor, for
similar reasons, can one believe that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws
concerning testamentary bequests. This is not an area like, say, labor relations, where
Congress intended to leave private parties to work out certain matters on their own.
Nor can I find some appropriately defined forbidden category by looking to the
congressional purpose of establishing uniform laws to regulate the administration of
pension funds ....This case does not involve a lawsuit againsta fund.
Of course, one could look for a still more narrowly defined category.... [b]ut to [do
so] is to change the question from one about occupying the field, to one about whether,
or the extent to which, Louisiana law frustrates or interferes with an important federal
purpose.
Id. at 1770-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
194. See id. at 1771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, by addressing the conceptual issues the dissenting
Justices avoided the doctrinal leap made by the majority. Although at
first blush there may appear to be little practical distinction between
the majority and dissenting approaches, a real difference exists.
Under the majority opinion, a law could be preempted under an implied "stands as an obstacle" analysis regardless of the meaning attributed to the phrase "connection with." By divorcing the implied
analysis from the meaning of the phrase "connection with," the majority has opened up the possibility of using the implied doctrines in any
case involving an express preemption provision; and, as noted above,
the theories can be used to justify preemption beyond the scope of the
express preemption clause. In contrast, Justice Breyer viewed the
implied doctrines as alternative tests for determining whether a state
law has a sufficient "connection with" ERISA plans to warrant preemption. Under Justice Breyer's approach, then, use of the implied
doctrines to inform the analysis is limited to cases where the express
provision is ambiguous and the theories would be used to help identify
the scope of the language of the preemption clause.
Thus, by failing to discuss how the implied doctrines should be
integrated into the ERISA preemption analysis, the majority in Boggs
has left unanswered the conceptual questions as to when and how the
doctrines should be used, while at the same time opening the door to
integration unnecessarily wide. When viewed in its entirety, it becomes apparent that the majority opinion has signaled the use of the
implied theories in cases involving a federal law with an express
preemption provision-with no limitations. Use of the implied theories to inform the express preemption analysis is a positive step in the
evolution of the preemption paradigm, but the parameters of their use
should be established. In future cases, the Court should follow the
approach initiated by the dissenting Justices in Boggs and more appropriately delimit use of the implied theories by integrating them
into the existing doctrinal framework.
IV. THE INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
As explained, the distinctions between the implied and express
preemption doctrines reflect, at their core, different approaches to
statutory interpretation. 19.
This implied preemption analysis
represents a more "purposive" approach, while the express
195. See supra Part II.B.3.
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preemption analysis reflects a classic "textual" approach. Thus, as
the paradigm shifts away from a categorical approach to preemption,
the issue becomes which approach to statutory interpretation should
be used. This Article advocates that, although a textual approach to
statutory interpretation may be sound in many contexts, the approach
is unsatisfactory in the context of preemption. 9 6 Instead, the use of a
more traditional "purposive" approach to statutory interpretation
leads to better outcomes. 197 The Article reaches this conclusion after
analyzing the Boggs decision and the differences between textual and
purposive theories of statutory interpretation. Analysis of the Boggs
case shows that a textual approach to statutory interpretation shortcircuits the identification of the federal law's purpose, a key issue in
deciding whether a federal law impliedly preempts state law under
the "stands as an obstacle" analysis, 98 and undermines important
policy considerations relevant in the preemption context. In contrast,
a purposive approach permits courts to assess more accurately
congressional purpose, and promotes policies implicated in the
preemption context, such as the appropriate accommodation of federal
and state authority to regulate.
A. The Boggs Analysis-A PurportedlyPurposiveApproach
The majority in Boggs held that ERISA preempted Louisiana's
community property laws to the extent the laws would recognize
Dorothy's sons' claims to Isaac's retirement benefits. 99 Specifically,
the majority found that permitting the claims to proceed would frustrate congressional intent reflected through two ERISA provisions.
One ERISA provision mandates that annuity benefits payable upon
retirement must be in the form of a joint and survivor annuity, which

196. The term "textual" is also used broadly in this Article to encompass those statutory
interpretation theories which focus predominantly on the text and structure of the statute at
issue. A textual approach to interpretation emphasizes the plain meaning or dictionary definition of statutory terms. See infra notes 285-309 and accompanying text.
197. The Article uses the term "purposive" broadly to encompass those forms of statutory
interpretation which look beyond the text and the structure of the statute. A purposive approach encourages courts, when interpreting statutory provisions, to consider the context and
background of the statute, including relevant legislative history. While the "intent" of the
legislature is always the touchstone of statutory interpretation, a purposive approach recognizes
that it may be impossible to attribute a particular intent to a collective group of legislators and
therefore, instead, tries to ensure that the "purpose" underlying the law is effectuated and that
the law's interpretation and application is reasonable. See infra notes 238-57 and accompanying
text.
198. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
199. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1762; see also supra Part III.A for a description of the facts in the
Boggs case.
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includes an annuity payable to a nonparticipant surviving spouse. 2°°
The majority found that permitting Dorothy's testamentary transfer
would diminish Sandra's right to the survivor's annuity and thus
frustrate Congress's purpose. 201 The other ERISA provision is an
20 2
exception to the general prohibition on alienation of ERISA benefits.
The exception permits a court to issue a decree creating or recognizing
a nonparticipant spouse's rights to benefits when resolving marital
property rights upon divorce or separation. 203 Thus, ERISA expressly
authorizes a transfer of benefits pursuant to a community property
claim only in the event of divorce or separation. Because Dorothy's
testamentary transfer did not fit within this express authorization,
the majority found that permitting the sons' action to proceed would
frustrate Congress's purpose.
As to both provisions then, the majority grounded its conclusion on a "stands as an obstacle" theory of implied preemption.
Application of this theory requires a court to identify the purpose
underlying the federal law and to ascertain whether the state law
frustrates that purpose. Identifying the purpose underlying the survivor's annuity was fairly clear-cut. Accordingly, the Court's holding
regarding the sons' claim to any portion of the annuity is less
troublesome and is omitted from this Article's discussion of the
2o4
case.

200. See id. at 1761.
201. See id. at 1762.
202. See id. at 1763; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
203. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1763.
204. Section 1055(a) of ERISA specifically requires plans to use qualified joint and survivor
annuities, payable to a nonparticipant surviving spouse. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994).
Further, unless waived, the survivor must be a surviving spouse, and ERISA ensures that an
equitable proportion of the annuity benefit continues to flow to the nonparticipant surviving
spouse after the participant's death. The majority opined that "[ilt would undermine the
purpose of ERISA's mandated survivor's annuity to allow Dorothy the predeceasing spouse by
her testamentary transfer to defeat in part Sandra's entitlement to the annuity § 1055
guarantees her as the surviving spouse." Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1762. The majority found that the
purpose underlying the annuity provisions was "to ensure a stream of income to surviving
spouses." Id. at 1761. The dissenting Justices agreed that Louisiana could not give Dorothy's
sons a share of the pension annuity without frustrating the purpose of ERISA's survivor annuity
provisions. However, the dissenting Justices disagreed that the sons' request for an accounting
should be preempted on this basis alone. The dissenting Justices pointed out that a Louisiana
state court might provide an accounting which would allow Dorothy's sons, as heirs, to recover
Dorothy's community property interest in such a manner that Sandra's right to the survivor's
annuity would be fully protected. See id. at 1775 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Further, the
dissenting Justices found nothing in ERISA that suggested a congressional concern with the
assets beyond the survivor's annuity. Id. Nonetheless, there was no real dispute as to the
purpose to be attributed to the ERISA annuity provision. Accordingly, the heart of the
case-and the crux of this author's view of the case-revolves around the analysis of the sons'
claims as to other aspects of Isaac's retirement benefits.
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In contrast, the Justices' analysis of the purpose underlying
the anti-alienation provisions at issue has proven to be quite troublesome. Rather than conducting a traditional "stands as an obstacle"
analysis, Justice Kennedy accorded considerable weight to the implications of Congress's failure to expressly recognize the right of a nonparticipant spouse to control benefits through testamentary transfer.
The dissenting Justices pointed out the deficiencies in the majority
opinion, but similarly failed to conduct a satisfactory preemption
analysis. The analysis in both the majority and the dissenting opinions relied on the text and structure of the statutory provisions only
and, thus, both opinions can be characterized as using a "purportedly
purposive" approach to the issue of implied preemption. The following subsections explain more fully the analysis of the Boggs majority
and dissenting Justices and why a purported search for the purpose
underlying the federal law yields an unsatisfactory analysis of the
preemption question.
1. The Majority's Analysis of the Anti-Alienation Provisions
In addition to the annuity benefit, Isaac received other retirement benefits from SCB, including a lump sum distribution which he
rolled into an IRA and ninety-six shares of AT&T stock.205 Dorothy's
sons also sought their share of these benefits. 216 The preemption
analysis as to the sons' claim to these benefits turned on ERISA's
spendthrift provision, § 1056(d), which prescribes that "benefits provided under the [retirement plan] may not be assigned or alienated."207 An assignment has been defined by regulation as "any direct
or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant
or beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any
part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to
the participant or beneficiary."20 8 The majority found that Dorothy's
testamentary transfer fell within the scope of this provision. 209 If the
majority could have rested its decision on this provision alone, its
conclusion would not have been as suspect because the transfer would

205. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1758.
206. See id. at 1759. In addition to these benefits, Dorothy's sons sought their share of the
monthly annuity paid to Isaac during his retirement but before his death. See id.
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
208. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1765; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1997).
209. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1761. Even though the sons were enforcing their interest
against Sandra, and not the plan, the majority noted that Louisiana law would permit
community property laws to be enforced against the plan. See id. at 1762.
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arguably be in actual conflict with an ERISA provision and, therefore,
preempted on the basis of the Supremacy Clause.210
However, Dorothy's testamentary transfer arguably fell within
the scope of an express exception to section 1056(d) enacted by
Congress through 1984 amendments to ERISA. Section 1056(d)(3)
provides that the anti-alienation provisions shall not apply to
qualified domestic relations orders ("QDRO).211 A QDRO is an order
that "creates or recognizes... an alternate payee's right to... receive
all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant
under a plan,"212 where the order is a judgment or decree that "relates
to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights of a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent
of a participant, and is made pursuant to a State domestic relations
law (including a community property law)."213
The QDRO provision would arguably support the right of
Dorothy's sons to seek an accounting of Isaac's benefits because their
interest arose from an analogous judicial order. A Louisiana probate
court had ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest
in Isaac's retirement plan. The sons, therefore, could argue that the
judicial order recognized an alternate payee's right (the sons') to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a plan
participant (Isaac); and that the judicial order related to the marital
property rights of a former spouse (Dorothy), and was made pursuant
to a community property law. Because the order was analogous, the
sons had a strong argument that recognizing their claim would not be
in conflict with ERISA.
However, the majority viewed the matter quite differently.
The Court had previously held that ERISA's anti-alienation provision
reflected Congress's "decision to safeguard a stream of income for
pensioners (and their dependents... ), even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them."214 As with the
annuity provision, the majority found that Congress enacted the
QDRO provisions to protect the nonparticipant spouse and dependent
children in the event of divorce or separation.2 5 The majority then
held that, because the annuity and QDRO provisions protect specific

210. The dissent, however, questioned whether a testamentary transfer fell within the
scope of the statutory language. See id. at 1772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (West Supp. 1998).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(dX3)(B)(iiXI)-(H).
214. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
215. See Boggs, 117 S.Ct. at 1763.
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pension plan community property interests, their enactment "gives
rise to the strong implication that other community property claims
are not consistent with the statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with
respect to the right of a nonparticipant spouse to control pension plan
benefits by testamentary transfer provides powerful support for the
conclusion that the right does not exist."16
Thus, although the majority was purportedly engaging in a
"stands as an obstacle" analysis, its conclusion did not rest on a finding that the effect of the state law would hinder the purpose underlying the federal law. The majority identified a purpose, but then shortcircuited the analysis by concluding that the "silent implication" was
that Congress could have intended no further protection of a nonparticipant spouse's legal interests in the benefits.
The majority supported its conclusion that Louisiana's community property law was preempted to the extent it permitted
Dorothy to bequeath her interest in Isaac's benefits through a number
of arguments. From a preemption analysis perspective, however, the
majority's arguments are unsatisfactory. First, the majority justified
the distinction between the community property interests of separated and divorced spouses and those of a predeceased spouse by
noting that the whole subject of domestic relations "belongs to the
laws of the states."217 However, the majority did not explain why the
subject of community property rights as determined by probate courts
is not wholly within the domain of the states.
The majority then simply recycled its "silent implication" argument in numerous ways. An amicus, the Estate Planning, Trust
and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of California, argued that
the law through which the QDRO amendments were enacted, the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"), was enacted in response to a
plethora of litigation over issues of property division and support
rights in the divorce and separation context. 218 Thus, the amicus
argued, Congress did not consider the community property rights of a
nonparticipant spouse in the testamentary context. The majority
responded by looking at the interplay of ERISA's provisions according
certain rights to "beneficiaries." ERISA confers "beneficiary" status
on a nonparticipant spouse only in relation to the survivor's annuity
and the QDRO.219 The Justices viewed the amicus as "ask[ing] us to
ignore [ERISA's] definition of 'beneficiary' and, through case law,
216. Id. at 1763-64.
217. Id. at 1764.
218. See id. (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 598-94 (1890)).
219. See id. at 1764-65.
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create a new class of persons for whom plan assets are to be held and
administered. The statute is not amenable to this sweeping extratextual extension."220 Thus, the majority reasoned that Congress intended to limit a nonparticipant's rights grounded in marital status to
those situations expressly articulated, thereby, in essence, recycling
the "silent implication" theory to support its prior "silent implication"
theory. Similarly, the majority recycled the argument by noting that
its conclusion that Congress intended to preempt the sons' interests
"is given specific and powerful reinforcement by the pension plan antialienation provisions."221 The majority noted that ERISA's pension
plan anti-alienation provision is "mandatory and contains only two
explicit exceptions.., which are not subject to judicial expansion.
The anti-alienation provision can 'be seen to bespeak a pension law
protective policy of special intensity: Retirement funds shall remain
inviolate until retirement.' ",222

Finally, when Justice Kennedy eventually tied the majority
opinion's conclusion to a purpose underlying the anti-alienation provisions, his reasoning also hinged on the perceived "silent implication."
The majority identified the federal purpose underlying ERISA generally as that of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries, and the
purpose underlying the specific anti-alienation provision as that of
keeping pension funds intact until retirement so that pensioners and
dependents will have a secure stream of income. 22

According to the

majority, permitting Dorothy's sons to pursue their interests under
Louisiana's community property laws could undermine this purpose:
"retirees could find their retirement benefits reduced by substantial
sums because they have been diverted to testamentary recipients.
Retirement benefits and the income stream provided for by ERISAregulated plans would be disrupted in the name of protecting a nonparticipant spouses' [sic] successors over plan participants and
beneficiaries."

22

Of course, the QDROs could similarly disrupt the stream of
income flowing to the retirees, thereby suggesting that the identified
federal purpose was not inflexible. Thus, the majority justified its
220.
221.
222.
LAW 547

Id. at 1765.
Id.
Id. (quoting JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
(2d ed. 1995)) (citations omitted). In addition to the QDRO exception, section 1056(d)

exempts voluntary and revocable assignments that do not exceed ten percent of any benefit
payment, or any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed before the enactment
of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
223. See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1766.

224. Id.
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preemption conclusion by explaining that the ERISA provisions reflect a careful balancing of interests and that the QDRO is a limited
exception designed to ensure that, in the event of divorce or separation, a living nonparticipant spouse would receive her community
property interest in the benefits and thus receive the stream of income that would otherwise be available.225 Viewed from this perspective, QDRO advances ERISA's underlying purposes. 226 In contrast,
the majority emphasized that recognizing the community property
interests of a predeceased nonparticipating spouse would not advance
this purpose.2 27 Notably, however, discerning a purpose of protecting
living nonparticipants but not predeceased nonparticipants, simply
from the existence of the QDRO and survivor's annuity provisions, is
tantamount to divining the purpose from Congress's "silent implication." Thus, although Justice Kennedy purportedly engaged in an
analysis grounded in the purpose of the ERISA provisions, scrutiny
reveals that the majority never fully justified its view of the underlying purpose of ERISA's anti-alienation and QDRO provisions.
2. The Dissenting Justices' Analysis of the Anti-Alienation Provisions
The dissenting Justices strongly disagreed that Congress's
silence as to testamentary transfers of a nonparticipant's community
property interest evinced an intent to preempt state laws permitting
such transfers. Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, acknowledged
that one purpose of the anti-alienation provision may have been to
"safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their

dependents...

)."228

However, the dissent noted a point ignored by

the majority: ERISA does not generally evince any purpose of
restricting what a plan participant (such as Isaac) can do with the
pension funds, either upon the participant's death or otherwise.22 9
Specifically, the dissent explained that ERISA would not restrict
225. See id. at 1766-67.
226. See id. at 1767.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1771 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)).

229. See id. at 1772. Specifically, the dissent pointed out that ERISA does not restrict what
a participant does with benefits after the participant's death. Thus, in discerning the purpose
underlying the anti-alienation provision, the question becomes what purpose could be served by
restricting a testamentary transfer of a nonparticipant spouse if testamentary transfers of
participants are not restricted. The most obvious answer is that a testamentary transfer by a
nonparticipant spouse before the death of the participant would deplete funds otherwise available to the participant. But, as the dissent noted, this purpose was not hindered in this case

because the sons' claims merely sought their share of benefits after both the participant (Isaac)
and the nonparticipant (Dorothy) had died. See id.
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Isaac from using his retirement benefits "to pay for a vacation, to buy
a house, [or] to bet at the races..." or from bequeathing his
community property interest in the retirement benefits.20 Thus, as
the dissent noted, the majority's argument hinged on a doubtful
From the dissent's
assumption about Congress's purposes.
perspective, the anti-alienation provision at most serves to safeguard
the funds until the point of retirement. Recognizing Dorothy's
testamentary transfer, which did not affect Isaac's benefits either
before retirement or before his death, would not interfere with this
231
purpose.
Justice Breyer also disagreed with the majority's view of the
implications which could be drawn from the QDRO provisions. The
dissent focused on the structure of the QDRO amendments and found,
as a threshold matter, that the QDRO provisions do not answer the
question whether the anti-alienation provision itself reaches probate
court orders. That is, the structure of the QDRO amendments suggests that Congress sought to clarify that the anti-alienation provision
applies to domestic relations order, and to exempt "qualified" orders.2 2 Further, the use of language such as "domestic relations
orders" suggests that Congress enacted the QDRO provisions due to a
233
concern with orders arising in the divorce and separation context.
According to the dissent, then, the provisions evince only an intent to
regulate transfers between living spouses and not an intent to affect
"[lilt would be anomalous to find a
testamentary transfers:
congressional purpose in ERISA-despite the absence of express
statutory language and any indication that Congress even considered
the question-that would in effect deprive Dorothy of her interest
because, instead of divorcing Isaac, she 'stayed with him till her last
breath.' "234 The dissent concluded by noting that finding a conflict
justifying preemption in this case would require a departure "from
what Congress actually said in ERISA and [an inference of] some
23
more abstract general purpose .... 2) 5
Thus, the dissenting Justices strongly disagreed with the majority's view that Congress's express provisions created a "silent impli230. Id. at 1772.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1773.
233. See id. The dissent specifically found that a probate order awarding property to an
estate or to children "cannot easily be squeezed into the definition of 'domestic relations
orders.'" Id.
234. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 15).
235. Id. at 1776. An example would be "to help a second wife at the expense of a first wife's
state law-created interest in her property." Id.
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cation" justifying preemption, and recognized that Dorothy's testamentary transfer of her community property interest was not in conflict with anything that Congress actually said. The dissent also discounted the majority's view of the purpose underlying the anti-alienation provisions. However, like the majority opinion, Justice Breyer
did not adequately justify the dissent's view of the purpose which
should be attributed to the federal provisions for purposes of a "stands
as an obstacle" implied preemption analysis.
3. Both the Boggs Majority and Dissent Failed to Adequately
Analyze the Key Inquiry: What is the Purpose
Underlying the Federal Law?
The majority's conclusion that Dorothy's sons' claims to any
portion of Isaac's retirement benefits were preempted was grounded
in the "stands as an obstacle" theory of implied preemption. Analysis
of whether a state law frustrates the attainment of Congress's
objectives involves several steps: an identification of congressional
purposes; an assessment of the effect of the state law; and a
determination of whether that effect "stands as an obstacle" to one of
the purposes underlying the federal law. The most troublesome
aspect of the Boggs decision is the Court's approach to the
identification of the purpose underlying the federal provisions.
Namely, the opinions reveal that both the majority and dissenting
Justices used a "textual" approach to statutory interpretation which
unduly limited the analysis of congressional purpose.
Justice Kennedy divined the purpose from the text and structure of the relevant statutory provisions: the anti-alienation provision, the QDRO exception, and the definitions of plan participant and
beneficiary. In the majority's view, recognizing Dorothy's sons' interest would be tantamount to an "extratextual extension" of the statute
because the express provisions, and their interplay with the statutory
scheme as a whole, reflect the full extent to which Congress intended
community property interests to be recognized.236 Thus, the majority
identified the key element in the "stands as an obstacle" analysis
solely from the "silent implication" of the inclusion of two provisions
expressly recognizing certain aspects of a nonparticipant spouse's
interest in ERISA benefits. The majority did not consider legislative
history, and discounted the litigious climate in which the QDRO
provisions were enacted. Moreover, the majority appeared to give

236. See id. at 1765.
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little weight to the presumption against preemption of state laws
within the scope of a state's traditional police powers.
The dissenting opinion pointed out this weakness in the majority's opinion, but engaged in a similar textual analysis to discern the
congressional purpose that should be attributed to the provisions for
purposes of an implied preemption analysis. Justice Breyer looked to
the language and structure of the anti-alienation provision and the
as a reason for rejecting the majority's "silent
QDRO provisions
7
implication. " 23
Both opinions, therefore, reflect a classic textual approach to
the identification of the purpose underlying the federal provisions.
But other purposes could reasonably be attributed to ERISA's antialienation provision and other approaches to statutory interpretation
would have required the Court to consider other factors in assessing
congressional intent. Indeed, as discussed in the following Part, the
"stands as an obstacle" theory of implied preemption evolved during a
period when-and reflects-the Supreme Court's use of a more
"purposive" approach to statutory interpretation which permits courts
to engage more fully in an analysis of the purposes of the federal law
and whether preemption is appropriate. The purportedly purposive
approach of the Boggs Court thus presents a fundamental
tension-Justices committed to a textual approach to statutory
interpretation were applying a doctrine grounded in a purposive
approach-thereby raising an interpretive issue, namely, whether a
textual approach to statutory interpretation is appropriate in the
preemption context. The following Part explores which approach to
assessing congressional intent will more likely lead to sound
preemption outcomes and concludes that the textual theory of
statutory interpretation is incompatible with the underlying tenets of
the implied preemption doctrines.
B. The Implied PreemptionDoctrinesRequire an Honestly
PurposefulApproach
Analyzing the interpretive issue of which approach to statutory
interpretation should be used as the preemption paradigm shifts
away from a categorical approach involves two inquiries: first, an
analysis of the relevant differences between a textual and a purposive
approach to statutory interpretation; second, a determination of
which approach would result in sounder outcomes given the policies
237. Id. at 1772-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

1202

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1149

underlying the doctrine of preemption. This Part concludes that a
purposive approach permits courts to assess more accurately the key
preemption issues, and promotes important policy considerations
relevant in the preemption context, such as effectuation of an appropriate accommodation of federal and state authority to regulate.
1. The Implied Theories-Grounded in Purposivism
Like other common law theories, the preemption doctrines
have evolved over time. As explained in Part II of this Article, the
Supreme Court first viewed preemption as an automatic consequence
of congressional action in fields such as interstate commerce.3 8 The
more modern view of preemption emerged in the 1930s, and was developed by the Court over a number of decades. 239 During this period,
the broadly accepted approach to statutory interpretation was
originalism-that is, the tradition of striving to discover original
legislative intent or purpose. Originalist theories of interpretation
are committed to the concept of the legislative supremacy of
Congress.240 Two common variants of originalism used in the midtwentieth century were the theories of intentionalism and purposivism.241

Under intentionalism, a court would look for clues that signal
the actual legislative intent regarding the statutory provision at issue.
The sources used to inform the analysis include the statute's text,
legislative history, and the circumstances surrounding its enactment.242 Text is important to the analysis, but an intentionalist may
view the text as insight to the legislative intent, rather than using
238. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
239. The case Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1933) (relying on the statutory

language and the practical interpretation of the federal law), has been identified as one of the
first cases in which the preemption issue turned on a finding of congressional intent. See
Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 806-07. For other key discussions of preemption see Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-16 (1978); New York State Dept. of Social Services v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413-23 (1973); FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 141-52 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-35 (1947).
240. Because the legislature has greater authority than the judiciary in the realm of policymaking, the concept of legislative supremacy establishes an agency relationship between the
two institutions; the legislature acts as the principle and the judiciary serves as the agent. See
Martin H. Redish & Theordore T. Chung, Democratic Theory & the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism In Statutory Interpretation,68 TuL. L. REV. 803, 810-11
(1994).
241. The names attributed to various interpretative approaches are not universally used.
However, the names intentionalism and purposive have been used by several scholars. See, e.g.,
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 23-27 (1988);
Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 812-17.
242. See Aleinikoff, supra note 241, at 23-24; Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 813.
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evidence of intent to give meaning to the text,24 because getting closer

to what the enacting legislature intended better serves the end of
legislative supremacy.2 " However, intentionalists recognize that
discovery of the original legislative intent is at times unlikely because
litigated statutory questions often involve issues never considered by
the legislature. Accordingly, it is sufficient to discern a "manifest" or
"imputed" intent, "something they are willing to call intent derived
from the materials deemed appropriate to consult in the search for
intent."245 Thus, although intentionalism permits a fair amount of
judicial discretion, it nonetheless exhibits a strong commitment to
legislative supremacy.
Purposivism, however, emerged as the more dominant strain of
originalism. Its success as a theory of statutory interpretation is
attributable to its key proponents, Professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks. 246 Teaching materials drafted by Hart and Sacks developed a
theory of statutory interpretation premised on the purpose of the
statute.2 7 The Hart and Sacks purposive approach to interpretation
has been described as a "weaker intentionalist model."24 8 Rather than

243. See Aleinikoff, supranote 241, at 23-24; Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 813.
244. See Aleinikoff, supranote 241, at 23-24.
245. Id. at 25. In discussing the technique known as "imaginative reconstruction," Judge
Posner has suggested that, in such situations, the 'judge should try to think his way as best he
can into the minds of the enacting legislatures and imagine how they would have wanted the
statute applied to the case at bar." Richard A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation-inthe Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
246. Professors Hart and Sacks taught at Harvard Law School and together developed a
comprehensive set of teaching materials which included an influential chapter on statutory
interpretation. These materials have only been recently published. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF

LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL PROCESS].
Hart initially collaborated with Abe Feller of Yale University and Walter Gellhorn at Columbia
University and produced teaching materials for a course on legislation for the 1941-42 academic
year. See id. at lxxiv. Hart continued to develop these materials upon returning to Harvard
after World War II in the 194747 academic year. See id. at lxxviii-lxxxv. Sacks, who had been
a student in Hart's legislation seminar in the Spring 1948 term, joined the Harvard faculty in
the 1952-53 academic year. See id. at lxxxv. The Hart and Sacks collaboration culminated with
the 1958 "tentative edition" of the teaching materials entitled, "The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law." See id. at xci. Although not published until
1994, the "tentative edition" was widely distributed and has been heralded as "[tihe most
influential and widely used text in American law schools during the 1950s .... " Id. at viii
(quoting MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960-THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 254 (1992)).
247. Hart's theory of interpreting the statute in light of its "purpose" was in line with the
approach advocated in the academic literature and Supreme Court opinions after 1938. See THE
LEGAL PROCESS, supranote 246, at lxxx-lxxxi.
248. Alienikoff, supra note 241, at 24. Hart and Sacks' methodology for statutory interpretation is also often referred to as the "legal process" approach. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV.405, 434-35 (1989). It has also
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attempting to discover what answer the enacting legislature would
have given to a specific statutory question, a purposivist court would
identify the broader purposes embodied in the legislation and
construe the statute to carry out those purposes. 249 Hart and Sacks'
purposivism rests on the assumptions that the legislature is comprised of "reasonable [persons] pursuing reasonable purposes reason251
ably"250 and that statutes, therefore, represent a "purposive act."
To identify a statute's purpose, Hart and Sacks advocated that
courts should consider relevant sources of information in addition to
the statute's text, such as the law's legislative history and the circumstances surrounding the law's enactment. 2 2 Further, Hart and Sacks
advocated that courts should explore the legal landscape to determine
how the statutory provision at issue could be made to fit into the
whole fabric of the law. 2 1s In particular, their theory posits that, in

construing a statute to carry out its purpose, courts should take into
account relevant overarching principles and policies and should
ensure that the interpretation is in accord with any relevant "policy of
clear statement," such as the premise underlying preemption that
state laws should not be found preempted absent "clear evidence" of
25 4
congressional intent.
Thus, purposivism does not purport to discern the enacting
legislature's subjective intent, but, instead, assumes that the legisla-

been associated with the public interest theory of legislation. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS 50-51 (1997).
249. See id.; see also THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at lxxx-lxxxi; Redish & Chung,
supra note 240, at 815.
250. THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at 1125; see also Redish & Chung, supra note
240, at 815.
251. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at 1121; see also Redish & Chung, supra note
240, at 815.
252. Notably, Hart and Sacks recognized the problems associated with considering legislative history. The Hart and Sacks materials make the point that, "[s]purious use of legislative
history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only when the
legislative history is doubtful do you go the statute." THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at
1232-33 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 543 (1947)). But, rather than suggesting a ban as do proponents of textualism, Hart
and Sacks simply urged the prudent use of legislative history. See id. at 1379.
253. See id. at 1379.
254. Hart and Sacks advocated that statutes should be understood as having not only an
immediate purpose, "but a larger and subtler purpose as to how the particular statute is to be
fitted into the legal system as a whole." THE LEGAL PROCESS, supranote 246, at 1377. Further,
when courts are uncertain as to the purpose to be attributed to a statute, they advocated that a
court may resort to an appropriate presumption drawn from the overarching general policy. See
id. at 1380; see also id. at lxxx-lxxxi ("Find out the purpose of your statute, and [c]onstrue it to
carry out the purpose, if (1) [tlhe language will bear that meaning[, and] (2) [t~he policy of clear
statement will [not] be violated by giving it that meaning."). The presumption against preemption constitutes a "policy of clear statement." Id. at 1209-10, 1241.
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ture intended a purposive interpretation. Like intentionalism, purposivism permits courts to temper the plain meaning of the text if it is
at odds with the statute's purpose in order to give effect to the spirit
of the law,255 although words may not be given a meaning they cannot
bear. As a result, some commentators argue that it permits greater
judicial discretion than intentionalism.256 Further, although Hart and
Sacks recognized the lawmaking supremancy of the legislature, some
critics note that their theory's assumptions marginalized it. Indeed, a
corollary of the theory is that judges interpreting statutes have
257
significant, and appropriate, policymaking discretion.
Supreme Court decisions during the formative years of the
modern conception of preemption reflect a "purposive" approach to
interpretation. Analysis of key preemption decisions reveals that,
although the text of the federal law has always been a key factor in
the preemption analysis, the Court historically looked beyond the text
in an effort to preserve the appropriate balance between federal and
state authority to regulate. Further, the Court affirmatively sought
to limit the scope of preemption to effectuate the presumption against
preemption. A congressional purpose to preempt state law had to be
"clear" and would be inferred only upon a finding of an
"unmistakable" conflict.
For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,258 which has
been described as the "locus classicus of modern preemption doctrine,"259 the Court held that the United States Warehouseman Act
("the Federal Act") preempted a number of state provisions regulating
the operation of grain warehouses, including prohibitions on charging

255. Indeed, Hart is credited with subjecting "plain meaning" approaches to interpretation
to an "especially negative review." See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at lxxx.
256. See Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 817.
257. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319
(1989).
258. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
259. Gardbaum, supranote 16, at 807. In Rice, the Court succinctly articulated the implied
theories which had emerged. The Court first explained that, since warehouses engaged in
interstate commerce, Congress was empowered to allocate the regulatory authority over them
as it deemed appropriate. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 229-30. However, because the United States
Warehouse Act legislated in a field which states had traditionally occupied, the Court emphasized that it must start with the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Id. at 230 (citing Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employ. Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 749 (1941); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)). The Court then
proceeded to articulate the parameters of the traditional categories of implied preemption: field
preemption due to pervasive federal regulation or a dominant federal interest, and preemption
due to a state policy that produces a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.
See id. at 230-31. The opinion can be credited with solidly establishing the "categorical"
approach to preemption.
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unreasonable rates, operating in the dual position of warehouseman
and dealer, mixing grains of differing quality and maintaining unsafe
warehouses. 260 The Court explained that, although an earlier version
of the statute contained a clause providing that nothing in the Federal
Act would limit the effect or operation of state laws relating to
warehouses and warehousemen, a later amendment deleted that
language and provided instead that the "power, jurisdiction, and
authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture... shall be
exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license
hereunder... ." 261 The Court then pointed to Committee Reports that
noted the language was "designed to make 'the Federal Act
independent of State laws' and to 'place the Federal Act on its own
bottom.' "262 The Court found that the term "exclusive" and the strong
language in the legislative history rendered congressional purpose
unambiguous.263 Thus, the Court based its decision on the Federal
Act's text, legislative history, and the context in which it was enacted.
Moreover, in accord with a purposeful approach to resolving
the preemption issue, the Court carefully delimited the scope of the
Although recognizing the Secretary's
Federal Act's preemption.
"exclusive" authority, the Court held that preemption depended on
"whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in
any way regulated by the Federal Act."2 64 Much state regulation of
warehouses and warehousemen was held to be preempted because the
Federal Act similarly addressed matters such as rates, operating in
the dual position of warehousemen and dealers, mixing grains of
differing quality and maintaining unsafe warehouses. However, the
Court found that several matters being enforced by the state were not
265
preempted by the Federal Act.

260. Rice, 331 U.S. at 222-29 (detailing the relevant state and federal provisions).
261. Id. at 223-24.
262. Id. at 234.
263. Id. at 233.
264. Id. at 236 (noting further that, if the Secretary has regulated a matter, "the federal
scheme prevails though it may be a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the

State").
265. See id. at 236-37. For example, there were no express federal provisions addressing

the state's concern with unwarranted drains on utility funds or the creation of unsound
financial structures which would affect the ability of warehousemen to render adequate service
at reasonable rates. See id. Notably, the dissenting opinion in Rice urged the Court to use even
greater scrutiny before finding state laws preempted. Justice Frankfurter strongly noted:
"Suffice it to say that due regard for our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival of
the reserved authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless
Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or the State's claim is in unmis-

takeable conflict with what Congress has ordered." Id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted that, through the federal Warehouse Act, Congress did not undertake a general,
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Significant implied preemption cases following Rice reflect an
even greater deference to state law as the Hart and Sacks approach to
statutory interpretation became more deeply ingrained in the judiciary. In FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, the Court held
that federal marketing orders approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture which established a standard for avocado maturity did
not supersede a California law which imposed a different and more
difficult to satisfy standard. 266 The federal orders were adopted
pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act which Congress enacted
to "ensure the stable and steady flow of commodities to consumers,
and 'to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality
and maturity... as will effectuate such orderly marketing... as will
be in the public interest.' "267 Preemption hinged on whether the state
law frustrated congressional purposes underlying the federal
regulatory scheme. 268 The dissenting Justices believed that the state
law clearly stood as an obstacle to Congress's purposes because fruit
determined to be mature according to federally approved standards,
and thus fit for sale in interstate markets, could be turned away from
269
California markets.
Nonetheless, following a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, a majority of the Court upheld the state law. The Court
looked to the text of the Federal Act and its legislative history. The

affirmative regulation of warehouses. Accordingly, the scheme did not persuasively indicate a
purpose to free a federal licensee from state regulations which governed other warehousemen
when those regulations were not in practical conflict with the requirements of federal law. See
id. at 242-45.
266. 373 U.S. 132, 152 (1963). The federal order established a maturity test for South
Florida avocados based on an annually drafted schedule of picking dates, sizes and weights. See
id. at 139. The regulations also forbade picking before prescribed dates unless exempted, and
required inspections for compliance with standards based on quality and physical characteristics
of Florida avocados. See id. California based its maturity standard on the oil content in the
avocados, prohibiting the transportation or sale in California of avocados which contained "less
than 8 percent of oil, by weight.., excluding the skin and seed." Id. at 133-34 (citing CAL.
AGRic. CODE § 792 (West 1962)).
267. Id. at 138 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) (1994)).
268. See id. at 142. The Court found that the standards, though different, did not present
an inevitable collision: the record demonstrated that growers could meet both standards. For
example, the federal order would permit the picking and marketing of avocados meeting the
California standard, and growers in Florida could attain the requisite oil content by leaving the
fruit on the trees beyond the earliest picking date. See id. at 143. Further, the Court found no
indication of field preemption. The Court noted that avocado maturity is not a subject "by its
very nature admitting only of national supervision." Id. at 143-44. Further, the Court found
that comprehensive federal regulation of minimum standards for picking, processing and
transportation of agricultural commodities "does not of itself import displacement of state
control over the distribution and retail sale of those commodities in the interests of the consumers .... " Id. at 145.
269. See id. at 166 (White, J., dissenting).
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Court found that the text's reference to "minimum standards... as
will effectuate.., orderly marketing" did not unmistakably reveal a
congressional scheme in which federal marketing orders should displace state standards. 20 The Court also noted that other provisions in
the Act reinforced the view that the marketing orders would be
regional in nature; 271 and, further, that the legislative history suggested that Congress intended to create a scheme by which growers
could cooperate, through the Department of Agriculture, to work out
local harvesting, packing, and processing programs. 22 The most
telling signal of the Court's purposive approach, however, was the
Court's consideration of the practical operation of the marketing
orders. The Court found that the "pattern which emerges is one of
maturity regulations drafted and administered locally.., designed to
do no more than promote orderly competition among the South
Florida growers."273 Use of the purposive approach, therefore, enabled
the Court to preserve state regulation despite a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme as to avocado maturity and a state law
which arguably interfered with the federal interest in interstate
commerce.
In Malone v. White Motor Corp., the Court similarly declined to
displace state law despite possible conflict with an important federal
poicy.2 7 4 At issue in Malone was a state law which established
minimum standards for funding and vesting of pension plans.275

White Motor Corp. raised a preemption challenge under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") because the law's requirements were
inconsistent with the obligations White Motor Corp. had undertaken
in its collective bargaining agreement.2 76 The Court first looked to the
270. Id. at 147-48. In assessing the language of the Act, the Court compared it to a Federal
Tobacco Inspection Act in which Congress had clearly declared the importance of uniformity.
See id. at 149. The Court's assessment of the text reflects the high standard accorded to the
presumption against preemption. As the dissent pointed out, it is "commonplace that when the
appropriate federal regulatory agency adopts minimum standards which on balance satisfy the
needs of the subject matter without disproportionate burden on the regulatees, the balance
struck is not to be upset by the imposition of higher local standards." Id. at 171 (White, J.,
dissenting).
271. See id. at 148-49.
272. See id. at 149-50 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 24-1241, at 22-23 (1935); S. Rep. No. 74-1011, at
15 (1935)).
273. Id. at 150.
274. 435 U.S. 497, 513-14(1978).
275. Id. at 499. The Minnesota law imposed on any employer who ceased to operate a place
of business or pension plan a pension funding charge sufficient to ensure that employees with
ten years of service would receive pensions accrued regardless of whether the benefits had
vested. See id. at 501-02.
276. The collective bargaining agreement, which gave to the employer the right to terminate the pension plan at any time, only obligated the employer to guarantee pensions for those

1998]

PREEMPTIONPARADIGM

1209

text of the federal law. The NLRA requires employers to bargain with
employees regarding pension plans, but the Court found nothing in
the NLRA that would expressly foreclose all state regulatory power
over pension plans. 277 Following a purposive approach, the Court then

looked beyond the text to another statutory scheme, the 1958
Disclosure Act ("the Act"), and its legislative history. The Court
construed the Disclosure Act as reflecting Congress's intent, at that
time, to leave regulation of pension plans to the states. 278 The
Disclosure Act represented a limited step by Congress to remedy the
widespread abuses in the unregulated pension field. The Act required
plan administrators to file with the Labor Department a description
of the plan and an annual report containing financial information, but
imposed no substantive regulations on plans.279

The Disclosure Act

also provided that "nothing contained in this subsection shall be
construed to prevent any State from obtaining such additional
information... or from otherwise regulating such plan."280 The Court
found that these provisions, viewed in light of Congress's study of the
problems in the pension field, showed that Congress intended for
28
states to have the power to regulate in the pension field. '

A striking point about the Malone analysis is that the clause in
the Disclosure Act that expressly preserved the state's power to
regulate could have been construed in a more limited manner. NLRA
case law had established that state laws would be preempted if they
282
controlled key economic weapons used in collective bargaining.

Thus, as the Eighth Circuit found, the states logically could be precluded from directly controlling the substantive terms of the contract
that results from collective bargaining.283 The Disclosure Act, then,
entitled to them; and employees were guaranteed to receive only about sixty percent of the
amount specified in the plan. See id. at 501.
277. See id. at 504-05. Notably, although the NLRA does not contain an express
preemption provision, courts have recognized an extensive area of implied preemption under the
labor laws. Section 301 of the Federal Management Relations Act preempts breach of contract
claims involving collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,
390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). Similarly, the Garmon doctrine is a branch of preemption resulting
from the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
278. See Malone, 435 U.S. at 505-06. The Court acknowledged that later a federal
enactment shifted away from the perspective that states should regulate the field of pension
benefits. See id. at 499 (citing ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
279. See id. at 506.
280. Id. at 505.
281. See id. at 507-12.
282. See Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employ. Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 149 (1976)
(holding that states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining table).
283. See Malone, 435 U.S. at 503 (explaining the procedural history of the case before the
Court).
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could have been read more narrowly as preserving state regulation of
pension plans to the extent otherwise permitted under NLRA case
law. This view would have preserved the strong federal role in the
area of labor policy. The majority's approach to the preemption issue,
therefore, reinforces the strength of the presumption against preemption accorded to state law under a purposeful approach. Preemption
was not found because congressional intent regarding the preemption
of state laws was not unmistakably clear.
In sum, the implied preemption doctrines were developed
during a period when the Supreme Court adhered to a purposive
approach to statutory interpretation. Landmark implied preemption
cases during the formative years reflect the influence of Hart and
Sacks, especially those cases based on the "stands as an obstacle"
theory of preemption. 284 To determine the law's purpose, and thus
how the law should be construed, the Court looked not only to the text
of the federal law, but also to other provisions in the law, to the law's
legislative history and to the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Further, the Court explored the legal landscape to ensure a
harmonious interpretation of the law: the Court looked to other relevant federal laws and their legislative history and to the law's practical operation. Moreover, the Court ensured that its interpretation
would not violate the relevant policy of clear statement, for example,
that preemption would not be inferred absent clear evidence of
congressional intent or an unmistakable conflict.
2. The Shift to a More Textual Approach to Interpretation
In more recent years, originalist theories of statutory interpretation have been seriously challenged and numerous theories have
been proposed as better interpretive models.285 At the most general
284. Other scholars have noted the influence of Hart and Sacks on the interpretive approach used by the Court through the years. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at cxv
(Eskridge and Frickey noting that the Burger Court was more oriented to the legal process
philosophy than the Warren Court because "the Court often massaged statutory text to be
consistent with statutory purpose or general principles of law").
285. Since the mid-1980s, scholars have been very active in the area of statutory interpretation. As Professor Redish has aptly noted, "originalism has come under attack from critics
who assert that it is based on false notions of ascertainable collective intent, that it exacerbates
the problem of anachronistic statutes, and that it does little to combat the 'pathologies' endemic
to the legislative process." See Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 804-05. The literature is
rich with proposed theories purporting to lead to more acceptable outcomes. See generally
Aleinikoff, supra note 241; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
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level, the emerging theories can be divided into two groups: those
adhering to the concept of legislative supremacy, and those advocating a more dynamic role for the judiciary. Recent Supreme Court
cases reveal that the Court as a whole has shifted away from originalist theories, but has still adhered to the concept of legislative supremacy.m In place of originalism, the Court has shifted to a more textual
287
approach to statutory interpretation.
In contrast to a purposive approach to interpretation, textualism relies primarily, and in some cases exclusively, on the statutory
text itself.288 Courts using a textual approach focus on finding the

"meaning" of the language used by Congress as a means of ascertaining what Congress intended. 289 In fact, some textualists advocate that
ascertaining congressional intent is not the objective of statutory
interpretation because the "objective indication of a statute's words" is
what constitutes the law.290

To find a statute's meaning-the

objective indication of the statute's words-the Court has used
dictionaries, grammar books, the entirety of the statute, analogous
provisions in other statutes, canons of construction, and common
sense. 291 The Court's early interpretation of ERISA's preemption
clause in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., is a prime example of the
textualist approach. 292 As described in Part III, the Court's
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281 (1989); Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory
Interpretation,Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL Lmis. J. 233
(1997); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV.
767 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); William D. Popkin, The
CollaborativeModel of Statutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988); Redish & Chung,
supra note 240; W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
InterpretationUnder the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV.383 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 248;
George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
JudicialCandorand StatutoryInterpretation,78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
286. As noted, the Court has moved away from a purposive approach toward a textual approach to interpretation. However, the textual approach shares with the purposive approach a
commitment to legislative supremacy: both theories are grounded in the view that a judge's role
is that of an agent of the legislature. See Sunstein, supra note 248, at 415,424-25.
287. Professor Sunstein noticed the shift to textualism in a number of Supreme Court cases
decided in the late 1980s. See Sunstein, supra note 248, at 415-16 n.29 (citing cases).
288. See id. at 415-19; Taylor, supranote 285, at 327 & 333-36.
289. See Taylor, supra note 285, at 334-36. "The meaning of text is said to be self-evident,
a product of the language itself; such a situation requires of a judge no active role of interpretation but simply a grasping of the meaning ready at hand." Id. at 355.
290. Scalia, supra note 150, at 32 (noting that, with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of
construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent because the issues involve points
of relative detail about which members of Congress and the President were likely "blissfully
unaware.").
291. See Redish & Chung, supranote 240, at 819-20.
292. 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).
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interpretation of the phrase "relate to," which governed the
preemption analysis for over a decade, was derived solely from the
293
Court's reference to Black's Law Dictionary.
Textualists are opposed to recourse to legislative history or
294
other sources that could arguably shed light on congressional intent.
Indeed, Justice Scalia, a strong advocate of the textualist approach,
has suggested that, once a court has ascertained the statute's plain
meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant.95
Legislative history is viewed as an inappropriate guide for
interpretation in part because senators and representatives are
frequently absent from debates and have insufficient time to read
committee reports. Additionally, the primary purpose of legislative
history has shifted from informing those who vote on bills to
influencing judges who resort to legislative history as authoritative
6
expressions of congrssional intent.1
Textualism, then, does not allow the interpreter to effectuate
the spirit of the law over the letter of the law, even if review of other
materials would convince a reasonable reader that the enacting legis97
lature could not have intended what the plain meaning suggests.
Thus, lower courts following the Supreme Court's early signal to use a
strict textual approach when construing the scope of ERISA preemption felt compelled to find state law causes of action preempted despite the lack of an appropriate remedy provided in ERISA.298 The
courts often noted the inequity of the situation, as well as the fact
293. See id. at 96-97, n.16; see also supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.

294. See Aleinikoff, supranote 241, at 22; Redish & Chung, supranote 240, at 807-08.
295. See Scalia, supra note 150, at 29-37. "My view that the objective indication of the
words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course,
to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a
statute's meaning." Id. at 29-30; see also Eskridge, supra note 285, at 623 (explaining Scalia's
concurring opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
296. See Scalia, supra note 150, at 29-37 (noting that one of the routine tasks of the
Washington lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislatures can recite in a
prewritten 'floor debate', or--even better-insert into a committee report).
297. See Aleinikoff, supra note 241, at 25. Justice Scalia has reinforced this aspect of
textualism through a discussion of the case of Churchof the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892), which he presents as a "prototypical" example of an analysis focusing on
legislative intent. According to Scalia,
It may well be that the statutory interpretation adopted by the Court in Church of Holy
Trinity produced a desirable result; and it may even be (though I doubt it) that it
produced the unexpressed result actually intended by Congress, rather than merely the
one desired by the Court. Regardless, the decision was wrong because it failed to follow
the text. The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.
Scalia, supra note 150, at 22.
298. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding preempted a wrongful death action brought against a utilization review entity, even
though the plaintiffs were left without a remedy for the entity's alleged negligence).
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that Congress likely did not intend such a result, but concluded that
preemption was consistent with the intention "expressed" by
299
Congress.
Yet, proponents advocate that textualism is linked to legislative supremacy in two ways. Textualism posits that only the language actually adopted by the legislature meets the constitutionally
prescribed procedures and thus constitutes "law."3 °0 Second, textualism arguably restricts the judicial lawmaking that may occur when a
court considers the legislative history and context of the statute.301
Thus, although plain meaning will not always identify the legislature's actual intent, it is deemed an acceptable approximation in light
of its alleged ability to promote judicial restraint.30 2 The commitment
to legislative supremacy, however, is debatable. Professor Redish has
noted that given the generality with which statutes are drafted and
the complexity of statutory disputes, few interpretive problems can be
resolved simply by reference to the express statutory text.
Accordingly, instead of ensuring that Congress's meaning prevails
virtually
over a judge's policy preference, textualism may "permit
303
door."
back
the
through
in
discretion
judicial
unfettered
It is therefore significant that the Supreme Court, as a whole,
has not adopted a pure textualist approach. Although the Court has
exhibited a tendency to focus foremost on the text of the statute and
on ascertaining its plain meaning, 3°4 some Justices temper the textual
analysis by recognizing that language does not occur in a contextual
vacuum.30 5 The Court in some cases has looked to the entirety of the

299. See, e.g., id. at 1333-34.
300. See Scalia, supra note 150, at 23; see also Sunstein supranote 248, at 416.
301. See Scalia, supra note 150, at 23. In defense of textualism and in opposition to
searching for unexpressed legislative intent, Justice Scalia has noted that "[t~he practical threat
is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their
lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field." Id. at 17-18.
302. See id. New textualists argue that, "to the extent originalist... models permit judges
to stray from the text..., judges substitute their own policy preferences for those embodied in
the statutory language." Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 821-22. However, several scholars
have noted that the textual approach actually encourages judicial discretion. See, e.g., Taylor,
supra note 285, at 367.
303. Redish & Chung, supra note 240, at 825; cf Sunstein, supra note 248, at 418. As
Professor Taylor has aptly explained: "Choice of a dictionary, choice of a particular definition,
and choice of an interpretation over what that definition signifies are all choices that are made
in light of contestable background assumptions that recourse to the dictionary does not eliminate." Taylor, supra note 285, at 376.
304. Eskridge has noted that the pre-Scalia Court had tightened up the plain meaning rule.
See Eskridge, supra note 285, at 691 n.1l (citing Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the
Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982)).
305. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
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statute, and to its object and policy.306 Further, the Court has recently

reinvigorated, in the express preemption analysis, the assumption
that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded
absent clear and manifest congressional intent. 30 7 However, there has
been minimal reliance on sources beyond the statute itself. Instead,
the Court is likely to require that the purpose, object and policy be
ascertainable largely from the language of the provision, its
surrounding statutory framework, and the structure of the statute as
a whole.30 8
Thus, even in a more temperate form, textualism is a more
restrictive approach to statutory interpretation than purposivism. 30 9
The predominant focus on the language and structure of the federal
law to the exclusion of legislative history, the circumstances surrounding the law's enactment or other relevant considerations, may
preclude any realistic attempt to ascertain Congress's purpose in enacting the law. Further, it prevents the judiciary from achieving a
harmonious interpretation of the law and from taking into account
important policies and principles. These deficiencies are particularly
troublesome in the preemption context--and this is especially so
when, as in the Boggs case, the Court is assessing whether a state law
frustrates the objectives underlying the federal law. Because a court
using a textual approach does not even purport to try to identify
Congress's real purpose in enacting the federal law, the analysis becomes a sham. Rather than the "purportedly" purposeful analysis in
the Boggs case, the implied theories of preemption, especially the
"stands as an obstacle" theory, require an honestly purposeful approach to interpreting Congress's intent. The following subpart
supports this conclusion by demonstrating that a purposive approach
to interpretation is more appropriate in the preemption context because it permits courts to assess more accurately congressional pur306. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86,
94-95 (1993).

307. See, e.g., New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. Further, the Court typically
notes that, in the context of preemption, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every preemption case.
308. See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; see also Taylor, supra note 285, at 351
(explaining that textualists restrict any recourse to notions of purpose because of that approach's reliance on legislative history, but accept scrutiny of purpose and design to the extent it
is decipherable within the text). When the Court has looked to the legislative history, its role
has largely been to disconfirm the apparent meaning of the statutory terms in especially egregious cases. See Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in
Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 235, 237 (1997).

309. However, the degree of distinction between the approaches may hinge on the particular case before the Court as well as on which Justice writes the opinion.
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pose, and promotes important policy considerations relevant in the
preemption context.
3. The Purposive Approach Better Serves the Policies
Underlying the Preemption Doctrine
In determining whether a textual approach to statutory interpretation is appropriate when conducting an implied preemption
analysis, important polices implicated by the preemption doctrines
should be considered. This Article focuses on policies arising from two
key aspects of preemption. First, the preemption question implicates
the relationship between the state and federal governments.
Specifically, the doctrine implicates the core federalism question-which government, federal or state, has the authority to
regulate in a particular area. Thus, one important policy goal of the
doctrine of preemption is that the judicial analysis effectuates an
appropriate accommodation of federal and state authority to regulate.
Second, preemption raises questions about the proper role of the
judiciary as a branch within the federal government.3 10
As a
constitutional matter, as long as Congress acts within an area
delegated to it, Congress may enact laws that preempt state laws and,
indeed, Congress may define the allocation of federal and state
regulatory authority. However, to the extent that preemption turns
on a question of statutory interpretation, the courts become involved
in the process of allocation.
A second policy goal underlying
preemption, therefore, is that the analysis does not result in the
judiciary overstepping the boundaries of its proper institutional role.
The following subsections show that a more purposive approach better serves these important policies and, therefore, is a more
31
appropriate methodology for the preemption analysis. '

310. See Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F.
515, 533 (1972); Elaine M. Martin, The Burger Court and PreemptionDoctrine: Federalism in
the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1985).
311. Although the following analysis draws upon the Hart and Sacks approach to interpretation, the author is not necessarily advocating a return to a pure legal process theory.
However, the author does believe that Hart and Sacks' theory is particularly useful in the
preemption context because of its directive to harmonize fundamental policies and to fit the
provision into the existing legal landscape.
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Ensuringthe AppropriateJudicialRole in the
PreemptionAnalysis

As noted, the preemption issue generally devolves to one of
statutory interpretation. Thus, the judiciary's role in the legislative
process is implicated. Analysis reveals that both the textual and the
purposive approach safeguard against judicial overreaching; however,
textualism may hamper the legislative process by preventing the
judiciary from fulfilling a necessary institutional role.
Under the Federal Constitution, legislation and the policy
judgments reflected therein are attained through the interaction
between Congress and the President.312 The Constitution provides no

role for the judiciary in the process by which a bill becomes federal
law. Rather, courts play a role only as a byproduct of the case or
controversy requirement of Article III. 313 That is, when a litigant's

right to relief in a judicial action turns on whether Congress intended
certain federal legislation to preempt state law, a court has the
authority to interpret the federal law at issue. 314 Nonetheless, the
relationship between the legislative and judicial branches has vital
ramifications for the lawmaking or policy-making process. 315 Policy-

making can be viewed as a "continuum of institutional processes
ljudicial, legislative, and administrative], sometimes acting independently, but often interacting in subtle and perhaps not always conscious ways to influence the behavior of other processes."316 When
courts interpret federal laws in the context of a case, policy-making
interaction between the legislative and judicial branches occurs.
Accordingly, it becomes important to avoid a counterproductive interaction--one which interrupts the continuum of institutional processes.
There are divergent views regarding the judiciary's role in
interpreting federal laws. For example, the judiciary's role has been
described as that of an honest agent or a relational agent on the one
312. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 9-10 (1975)
(explaining the constitutional requirements for enacting statutes).
According to the
Constitution, the only appropriate law is that which both houses of Congress and the President
have approved (or in some cases enacted over the President's veto). See INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983) (striking down legislative vetoes because they effectively legislated
outside the bounds of the constitutionally approved process).
313. See Zeppos, supranote 285, at 379.
314. See KATZMANN, supra note 248, at 46.
315. See id. at 47 (citing numerous articles exploring the interaction between courts and
Congress).
316. Id. (quoting ROBERT A KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY:
TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 9 (1986)).
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hand; and as an adjunct or a partner in the legislative process on the
other. 317 The different views of the judiciary's role are given life
through various theories of statutory interpretation. As explained,
purposive theories of interpretation and textual theories are significantly different. However, both approaches are committed, in theory,
to the notion of legislative supremacy; in other words, the notion that
Congress is the branch of government primarily responsible for
policymaking, and that the judiciary's role is limited to effectuating
that policy by deciphering legislative commands and applying them to
particular cases.318 In practice, however, the theories are premised on
differing means of realizing that commitment and, in fact, satisfy the
commitment to differing degrees.
The textual approach views the judiciary's role as that of a
very limited agent of the legislature. A court using a textual approach
views its task narrowly as that of ascertaining the meaning of the
statute, usually by examining the statutory provision's text and the
statute's overall structure.319 As explained in the previous Part, even
if other materials would convince a reasonable person that the
enacting legislature could not have intended what the plain meaning
suggests, a focus on the plain meaning does not allow the judiciary to
give effect to the spirit of the law over the letter of the law.32o
Proponents of textual interpretation have explained that this approach ensures that the judiciary does not overstep its institutional

317. The view that judges are agents or servants of the legislature is the most prominent
conception of the role of courts in statutory construction. Underlying this view is the rationale
that, "[i]n a democratic system, with an electorally accountable legislature and separated powers,... the appropriate and indeed constitutionally prescribed role of the courts [is] to apply
legislative commands...." Sunstein, supra note 248, at 415. However, some scholars have
advocated for an approach to interpretation which permits judges greater flexibility. "The static
vision of statutory interpretation prescribed by traditional doctrine is strikingly outdated. In
practice it imposes unrealistic burdens on judges, asking them to extract textual meaning that
makes sense in the present from historical materials whose sense is often impossible to recreate
faithfully." William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1482 (1987). The dynamic approaches have, in turn, been criticized as permitting courts to go
beyond their institutional roles:
The judiciary that dynamic scholars envision for purposes of statutory interpretation
bears little resemblance to the judiciary posited by either new textualists or originalist
commentators. Instead of deciphering and implementing the decisions of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary, from the dynamics perspective, acts as an adjunct in the
legislative process or, more precisely, a superlegislature.
Redish & Chung, supranote 240, at 807.
318. However, the textual approach shares with the purposive approach a commitment to
legislative supremacy: both theories are grounded in the view that a judge's role is that of an
agent of the legislature. See Sunstein, supra note 248, at 415, 424-25; cf Redish & Chung,
supranote 240, at 805.
319. See supra notes 285-309 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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role by requiring Congress to act affirmatively to overrule judicial

interpretations which do not give effect to the spirit of the law.321
This argument, however, is especially weak in the preemption
context.3

22

First, although Congress has enacted a multitude of pre-

emption provisions, Congress has failed to satisfactorily define the
scope of the express preemption provisions. Indeed, Professor Fisk
has opined that Congress simply cannot, ex ante, draft meaningful
preemption provisions. 323

At the same time, Congress has dem-

onstrated an inability to modify the language of preemption provisions even in light of judicial decisions pointing out textual inadequacies. ERISA preemption, again, is a prime example. When ERISA
was first enacted, there was some initial attempt on the part of
Congress to "manage" the federalism issues.3 24 However, congressional willingness or ability to manage federalism rapidly faded and
as a result the state of ERISA preemption has been described as
"diseased federalism."325 Logically, Congress is even less likely to
321. See supra notes 300-02.
322. This Article express no view as to whether the premise is more meritorious in contexts
other than that of preemption. However, the popular appeal of textualism may be waning. See
Solan, supra note 308, at 239.
323. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?A
CaseStudy of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 96 (1996).
It may be that when Congress passes a statute covering a relatively narrow subject, it
can decide in advance all the preemption issues that are likely to arise and resolve them
itself. But when it enacts a lengthy and complex statute that displaces state law and
regulates across the scope of the employment relationship ... Congress simply cannot
anticipate all the preemption problems that are likely to arise.
Id.
324. A decade ago, ERISA preemption was heralded as a successful experiment in federalism because the scope of preemption was periodically recalibrated through case law construction
and subsequent legislative amendments. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemptionof
State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism,48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 429 (1987). As described
by Professor Gregory, the enactment in 1974 of detailed preemption and saving clauses revealed
Congress's desire to carefully address the allocation of authority over employee benefit plans
between the federal and state governments. See id. at 450-53. Several amendments then
followed. In 1982, Congress amended ERISA to permit states to regulate the reserve levels of
fully insured multiple employer welfare arrangements; a 1983 amendment permitted Hawaii to
operate a health insurance program aimed at lowering the rate of uninsurance; and a 1984
amendment exempted qualified domestic relations orders from the general prohibition on
alienation. See id. at 472-77.
These incidents of legislative recalibration... have provided a series of important
lessons regarding the dynamism of the preemption doctrine in employment law. The
virtually absolute original ERISA preemption language has been contoured to allow
operation of innovative state legislation that does not threaten the pension plan
protection objectives that are at the heart of ERISAId. at 433-34.
325. See, e.g., Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriersto IncreasingHealth Care
Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 346-47 (1990); Jolee Ann Hancock,
Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CuMB. L.
REv. 383, 407 (1995). Professor Fisk has noted that the ERISA experience shows that "it is a
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manage federalism in the implied preemption context. If Congress
will not manage the federalism issue, judicial reliance on a textual
approach in the preemption context is unwarranted.326
Indeed,
although not overstepping its judicial role, a court using a textual
approach is not likely to fulfill the judicial role of effectuating policies
established by the legislature. The result is a legislature and judiciary working at cross purposes.
In contrast, the purposive approach enables the judiciary to
fulfill its institutional role as well as safeguard against judicial overreaching. The purposive approach to interpretation views the judiciary as a more active participant in the lawmaking process. Although
also grounded in the notion of legislative supremacy, a fundamental
tenet of a purposive theory of interpretation is that policy should
evolve through the interaction of courts and the legislature.327 A court
using a purposive approach puts itself in the place of a reasonable
legislature, strives to ascertain the underlying reason for the
provision, and, when necessary, looks beyond the text of the statute to
the context of its enactment. 28 Further, if doubt exists as to the
purpose underlying the statute, a court following a traditional purposive approach will strive to interpret the provision in a way that
best harmonizes fundamental policies and fits the provision into the
general fabric of the law.329
A judiciary acting as a participant in the lawmaking process is
not overstepping its institutional bounds. The Constitution gives the
legislature the power to enact laws and establishes the fundamental

great deal more difficult for Congress to correct flawed statutes than it is to enact them in the
first place." Fisk, supra note 323, at 99.
326. Professor Fisk has also noted:
If one believes that courts should not correct statutory errors, one must believe that
Congress will fix the problem or that the cost of its failing to do so is worth the gain in
judicial legitimacy.... As for the latter idea, a great deal of unintentionally irrational
law is not a fair price for a small fig leaf ofjudicial legitimacy.
Fisk, supra note 323, at 99.
327. See Eskridge, supra note 257, at 319; see also Sunstein, supra note 248, at 426 (noting
that "resort to purpose was an effort to maintain the role of the courts as agents of the legislature while at the same time acknowledging the inadequacy of textualism.").
328. See supranotes 246-57 and accompanying text.
329. See Sunstein, supra note 248, at 426. A fundamental premise of the legal process approach is the notion of institutional settlement. According to Hart and Sacks, a court interpreting a statutory provision is determining what meaning ought to be given to it-within the
judiciary's institutional role. Specifically, courts are bound to respect the constitutional position
of the legislature and the constitutional procedures for the enactment of legislation. Thus, the
discretion accorded to the courts to determine what purpose ought to be accorded to a statute is
delimited by the principle that words may not be given a meaning that they will not bear.
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principle of separation of powers.3 30 Nonetheless, as noted, the governance in the United States is a process of interaction among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches. 3sl As envisioned by the
Founders, although "[n]o branch was to encroach upon the prerogatives of the others.., in some sense each was dependent upon the
others for sustenance and vitality. And that interdependence would
contribute to an informed and deliberative process."332 Thus, the
institutional role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process, although
limited to the interpretation of statutes, includes some responsibility
for the effectuation of the policy statements declared by the legislature. 3 3 Notably, the degree of responsibility may vary depending on
the federal law at issue.
Preemption constitutes a distinct type of policy statement by
the legislature and one which may more readily depend upon interdependence between Congress and the judiciary. As noted, Congress
has had particular difficulty drafting, ex ante, preemption provisions.
Even if legislators try to imagine circumstances where the language
might produce an undesirable result, they simply cannot be expected
to envision all possible state laws that might be affected by a preemption provision. 334 Additionally, a preemption clause has a more
dramatic effect than a substantive provision of federal law. Rather
than just regulating conduct, a preemption clause involves the allocation of authority to regulate between the federal and state governments and thus can invalidate substantive state laws.
Accordingly, it should be recognized that, in the preemption
context, the judiciary has a heightened responsibility for effectuating
policy; and the approach to statutory interpretation should not enhance the potential for results at cross-purposes with the work of the
legislature.335 A textual approach creates just this potential through
330. The Constitution's system of checks and balances, of course, precludes complete
separation of the three branches of federal government created by the framers of the
Constitution. See JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3.5 (3d ed. 1986).
331. See KATZMANN, supra note 248, at 1; see also NOWAK, supra note 330, at § 3.5 ("While

people sometimes refer to the three branches of the federal government as a three-layer cake, it
is more accurate to think of it as a marble cake.").
332. KATZMANN, supranote 248, at 1. See supranote 316 and accompanying text.
333. Notably, although the "interdependence" envisioned by the Founders between the
legislature and the judiciary would permit courts to have an affirmative role in the legislative
process, the judiciary would not rise to the level of a "superlegislature" as envisioned by proponents of dynamic theories of interpretation. See supra note 317.
334. See Fisk, supra note 323, at 54 (noting that the imagination of legislators is generally
constrained by a shortage of time or experience).
335. Cf Wolfson, supra note 147, at 96 (noting that, to serve the goals of federalism,
preemption should "secure to both the federal government and the states the right to regulate in
their proper fields of authority").
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its fundamental premise that Congress will step in and correct legis33 6
lative deficiencies revealed through judicial interpretations.
Further, because of the overarching importance of federalism in the
preemption context, the judiciary's approach should enable a court to
give effect to the policy of clear statement (that preemption will not be
inferred absent clear evidence of congressional intent) and ensure
that the law fits into the general fabric of the law.337 A more purposive approach to interpretation, then, better ensures the appropriate judicial role in the process of allocating the authority to regulate
between the federal and state governments-it does not result in
judicial overreaching and, in fact, helps ensure that courts fulfill their
institutional responsibility.3 38 The following subpart similarly shows
that a more purposive approach better serves the second, and related,
policy consideration effectuating an appropriate accommodation of
federal and state authority to regulate.
b.

ProtectingFederalismConcernsInherent
to the PreemptionAnalysis

As noted, the Court has historically recognized that preemption raises the core federalism question of which government, federal
or state, has the authority to regulate a particular area. In light of
this fundamentally important policy consideration,
Justice
Frankfurter once eloquently noted:
Suffice it to say that due regard for our federalism, in its practical operation,
favors survival of the reserved authority of a State over matters that are the

336. It has been noted that ignoring legislative history is an "assault on the integrity of the
legislative process" and that, "in doing so.... the judiciary comes 'perilously close to impugning
the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations, and, in that sense, running the risk of
violating the spirit if not the letter of separation of powers.'" KATZMANN, supra note 248, at 64
(citations omitted).
337. Professor Fisk has made a similar argument in the ERISA context. See Fisk, supra
note 323, at 90-92. She argues that, because ERISA's preemption clause does not definitively
resolve the proper balance between state and federal law, courts should use a "pragmatic
approach" and develop a theory of regulatory federalism. Id. at 91. "What the courts ought to
ask themselves in deciding ERISA preemption cases, therefore, is a pragmatic question: to
what extent will decentralization of regulatory authority over this area of law facilitate or
hamper the sensible operation of the law?" Id. at 92. She, in essence, argues that courts should
take a purposive approach and seek to harmonize the law with overarching policies and principles.
338. Viewing a purposeful approach to interpretation as a means of fulfilling the judiciary's
institutional role has been recognized in the preemption context. Justice Frankfurter noted
that the preemption issue involved "the duty of judicially adjusting the interests of both the
Nation and the State, where Congress has not clearly asserted its power of preemption so as to
leave no doubt that the separate interests of the States are left wholly to national protection."
See Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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intimate concern of the State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of

all State authority, or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what
339
Congress has ordered.

This subpart shows that the Court's traditional approach to the
implied theories of preemption safeguarded federalism concerns by
balancing the relevant interests, and that textualism radically
departs from the carefully crafted balance.
The development of the implied theories of preemption reflects
a careful accommodation of state and federal authority through a
number of judicially recognized presumptions and policies relevant in
the preemption context. Foremost, the Court developed the presumption that laws enacted pursuant to the historic police powers of the
states are not to be deemed superseded unless there is clear and
manifest evidence of congressional intent to preempt. As explained in
Part II, this presumption evolved in light of the restructuring of
American federalism in the 1930s in order to avoid the preemption of
vast areas of state law.3 40

The evolution of the implied theories of

preemption further reflects the Court's attempt to ensure an
appropriate accommodation. Specifically, the "stands as an obstacle"
theory of implied preemption historically permitted an inference of
congressional intent to preempt only when the state law
unmistakably frustrated the objectives of Congress. 341 Additionally,
the Court recognized heightened standards for the preemption of
certain types of state laws. For example, the Court pronounced that
state "family-property laws must 'do major damage' to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests" before such laws would be deemed
preempted. 2 These developments suggest that a full inquiry into the
339. Id.
340. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. It has been noted that, to protect federalism concerns, "[tihe essential element of any constitutionally legitimate doctrine of preemption must be an affirmative act on the part of Congress which manifests a clear and unambiguous intent to set aside state law." Corby & Smith, supranote 144, at 443.
341. In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, Justice Kennedy stressed the
high threshold of conflict established in the Supreme Court's prior cases:
Any conflict must be 'rreconcilable .... The existence of a hypothetical or potential
conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute... . In my view,
this type of pre-emption should be limited to state laws which impose prohibitions or

obligations which are in direct contradiction to Congress's primary objectives, as
conveyed with clarity in the federal legislation.
505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
342. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). In Hisquierdo, the Court

noted that, "[oln the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal
statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether
Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted.... A mere
conflict in words is not sufficient." Id.; see also Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly:
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congressional purposes underlying federal law, and a clear finding of
conflict, are integral to the balance struck in the preemption context.
The textual approach used by the Court in Boggs upset the
traditional balance struck by the Supreme Court in the implied preemption context. The majority in Boggs held that Louisiana's community property laws were superseded to the extent they recognized
Dorothy's sons' claims to any portion of Isaac's retirement benefits.
Preempting state laws so obviously within the domain of traditional
state regulation clearly has serious federalism consequences. The
Court was able to reach this result because it strayed from the presumptions and standards developed in earlier Supreme Court cases.
The Court did not adhere to the principle that state family-property
laws must do "major damage to clear and substantial" federal interests before such laws may be found impliedly preempted. Indeed, the
Court did not even give any real weight to the traditional presumption against preemption. Moreover, rather than applying the high
standard of "irreconcilable conflict," the Court in Boggs found that the
"silent implications" of ERISA's anti-alienation provisions effectively
preempted the state community property interests. 43 It is difficult to
see how a "silent implication" could ever pass muster given the
presumptions and policies developed in the preemption context to
address the federalism concern. Thus, the Boggs decision readily
shows that a textual approach to the preemption question vitiates the
safeguards put in place to help maintain an appropriate accommodation of federal and state authority to regulate.3"
A judiciary committed to a more purposive approach to the
preemption issue will therefore better promote relevant policy considerations. A purposive approach will enable the courts to give real
effect to the presumption against preemption. Further, a consideration of how the issue should be resolved from the perspective of
FederalPreemptionof State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 565 (1997) (advocating for use
of the "clear statement rule" in the preemption context).
343. This is a particular paradox given that Justice Kennedy, who authored the Boggs majority opinion, emphasized the "high threshold" of "irreconcilable conflict" in his concurring
opinion in Gade. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
344. As Justice Frankfurter once noted:
Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the farreaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications
to achieve the super-session of State authority. To construe federal legislation so as not
needlessly to forbid preexisting State authority is to respect our federal system. Any
indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak
with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure the full federal authority, completely
displacing the States.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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"weaving a harmonious fabric of the law" will prevent unnecessary
encroachments on state authority to regulate areas within the states'
traditional police power.345 The following brief analysis, for example,
readily shows that the outcome and analysis in Boggs would have
been more satisfactory if the Court had used an "honestly purposive"
approach rather than a textual and thus "purportedly purposive"
approach. The analysis is brief because it is intended to be illustrative only. Further, although the analysis in this subpart follows the
Hart and Sacks methodology, the author does not advocate a return to
a pure legal process approach to interpr~etation. However, the author
does believe that Hart and Sacks' theory is particularly useful in the
preemption context because of its directive to harmonize fundamental
policies and to fit the provision into the existing legal landscape.
c.

A More Reasoned and ReasonablePreemptionAnalysis

As to the benefits beyond the survivor's annuity, Sandra's challenge to Dorothy's testamentary transfer of her interest in the SCB
retirement plan presented the issue whether the anti-alienation and
the QDRO provisions evinced a congressional intent to preempt any
transfer of community property interests beyond those explicitly
recognized by the QDRO provisions.3 6 A purposive approach would
have begun with an analysis of the text of the provisions, but would
have prompted the Court to acknowledge that the text and the structure of the provisions were unhelpful. 4 7 As noted, the majority in
Boggs readily viewed Dorothy's transfer as falling within the scope of
the anti-alienation provision and viewed the QDRO provision as a
narrow exception recognized by Congress. The majority believed that

345. See also Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law, Preemption and Risk Management, 2 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 69, 75 (1997) (noting that preemption law should more openly allow courts to make
interpretations and craft arrangements that make jurisprudential, economic and administrative
sense).

346. As explained, the majority in Boggs readily viewed Dorothy's transfer as falling within
the scope of the anti-alienation provision and viewed the QDRO provision as a narrow exception
recognized by Congress. Looking to the text of the provisions, the majority determined that the
anti-alienation provision was intended to protect a stream of income for retirees and their
dependents; and that the QDRO reflected a decision to protect living spouses and dependents,

but not to protect other transfers of community property interests. The dissent noted that the
majority's view of the provisions' purpose was implausible given that ERISA does not attempt to
regulate what retirees do with their funds after distribution, but did not further explore what
purpose should be accorded to the statutory provisions. See supraPart IV.A for a more detailed
discussion of Boggs.
347. When the Justices of the Supreme Court cannot agree on the meaning of the text,
surely it is appropriate to acknowledge that the text simply cannot be the primary focus of the
analysis.
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the "silent implication" of the text was that only court orders falling
within the scope of the QDRO were exempt.
In contrast, the dissenting Justices believed that the text of the
provisions revealed an intent to exempt "qualified" orders from the
scope of the anti-alienation provision, but nothing more.
The
"language does not tell us what the word 'alienation' would cover in
its absence. It does not tell us whether the amendment taken as a
whole clarified that the anti-alienation provision covers court
orders.., or extended that coverage so that it included domestic
relations orders." 48 The dissenting Justices also noted that the fact
that the QDRO provisions concern divorce and separation evinces an
intent to regulate transfers between living spouses, but does not
evince any intent to affect testamentary transfers.39 Thus, an
analysis focused solely on the text of the provisions does not reveal
with any degree of certainty the purpose which should be attributed
to the provisions for purposes of a preemption analysis.
Under a purposive approach to the question, a court would
then look beyond the statute's language and structure in order to
determine what purpose or policy or underlying principle ought to be
attributed to the provisions at issue.3 50 While a court could not attribute to the statute a meaning that the words would not bear, the
court would treat the statute as not only having an immediate purpose, but also a larger and subtler purpose in its relation to the legal
system as a whole. Thus, a court would consider the context of the
statute's enactment and inquire why, given the state of the law, a
reasonable legislator would have enacted the provision. 351 In addition
to the text of the ERISA provisions, then, the history of the
amendments through which Congress created the QDRO provisions,
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA7),52 would become relevant
to the analysis.
Congress included the anti-alienation provision in ERISA as it
was originally enacted in 1974. The provision simply prohibits the
5
assignment or alienation of benefits provided under the plan.3 3

348. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1773 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349. See id.

350. As Hart and Sacks noted, "[tihe criteria for deciding what purpose ought to be attributed to a statute, when the words admit of more than one purpose and more than one is ra-

tionally conceivable, touch at the core of the problem of interpretation." THE LEGAL PROCESS,
supra note 246, at 1125.
351. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
352. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 417 (1994 & Supp.
1996)).
353. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp. 1998).
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Viewed broadly, the general terms of the provision would arguably
preempt state court orders directing transfer of pension benefits to
the non-employee spouse and dependents incident to divorce or separation. But it was not clear that Congress intended such a result.
Thus, the issue whether the anti-alienation provision applied to
spouses was litigated in case after case. 35

Importantly, these cases

were confined to the issues of property division and support rights in
the context of divorce or separation.35 5 The clear majority of cases
held that Congress did not intend for the anti-alienation provision to
apply so as to preclude the enforcement of property rights created in
356
the divorce/separation context.
Nonetheless, the legislative history suggests that Congress
enacted the REA so that non-employee spouses would not be required
to go to court to enforce their rights pursuant to property settlement
orders.3 57 Under this view, Congress enacted the QDRO provisions to
affirm that the anti-alienation provision was never intended to
encompass domestic relations orders. However, it could also be
argued that, if courts were correctly holding that the anti-alienation
provision did not bar enforcement of property rights created in the divorce/separation context, there was no real need for Congress to step
in to affirm the law. Thus, the enactment could be construed as evidence that Congress wanted not only to clarify that the anti-alienation provision was intended to encompass domestic relations orders,
but also to create a limited exception for certain domestic relations
orders. As with analysis of the text, then, consideration of the legislative history and the context of the enactment also does not clearly
point to the purpose which should be accorded to the provisions for
purposes of the preemption analysis.
Under the purposive approach as conceived by Hart and Sacks,
when doubt still remains as to the purpose which ought to be attributed to a statute, a court may resort to an appropriate presumption
drawn from some general policy of law.35 8 This enables a court to

ensure that its interpretation fits the statute appropriately into the

354. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1463 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
355. See id. at 1463 n.1 (explaining that only one district court case raised the issue in the
testamentary context and citing Employees Sav. Plan of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Geer, 535 F. Supp.
1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
356. See id. at 1463.
357. See id. at 1465. The legislative history notes that the "bill clarifies that such [a
qualified domestic relations] order does not result in a prohibited assignment or alienation." Id.
(citations omitted).
358. See THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 246, at 1380.
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"general fabric of the law."359 According to Hart and Sacks, "reflection
about these presumptions is the most important task in the
development of a workable and working theory of statutory interpretation."360 When interpreting a statute for the purpose of determining whether the statute preempts state law, the assumption
against preemption of state law logically seems to be the relevant
presumption. 61
Following a more purposive approach, then, when analyzing
whether the QDRO and anti-alienation provisions in ERISA reveal
congressional intent to preempt state community property law, a
court would approach the issue from a very different perspective than
did the majority in Boggs. Effectuating a presumption against preemption means that the analysis must be approached from the perspective that the assumption must be overcome by clear evidence of
congressional intent: a "silent implication" simply would not suffice.
Rather, a court would approach the analysis from the perspective
that, "[s]o long as full scope can be given to the amendatory legislation
without undermining non-conflicting State laws, nothing but the
clearest expression should persuade [the court] that the federal Act
wiped out... State requirements deeply rooted in their laws."362 The
Boggs dissent pointed out that the anti-alienation provision and the
QDRO amendment could be given full effect without the preemption
of Louisiana's community property law:
Congress has recognized that community property law, like any other kind of
property law, can create various property interests for nonparticipant spouses.
Community property law, like other property law, can provide an appropriate

legal framework for resolving disputes about who owns what. The antialienation provision is designed to prevent plan beneficiaries from prematurely
divesting themselves of the funds they will need for retirement, not to prevent
application of the property laws that define the interest in those funds. One
cannot find frustration of an 'anti-alienation' purpose simply in the state law's
3 63
definition of property.

359. According to Hart and Sacks, "The purpose of a statute must always be treated as
including not only an immediate purpose or group of related purposes but a larger and subtler
purpose as to how the particular statute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole." Id. at
1377.
360. Id. at 1380.
361. Indeed, Hart and Sacks recognized that, in some cases, controlling weight ought to be
given to the "policy of clear statement" reflected in the "prevailing policy against incautious or
casual extensions of federal power into spheres occupied by the states." Id. at 1240-41.
362. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 245 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
363. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1772 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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Thus, a purposive approach to statutory interpretation would have
avoided the serious federalism implications caused by the finding of
preemption in the Boggs case.
More important than the difference in outcome, however, is
that a purposive approach would have resulted in both a more
"reasoned" analysis of the preemption issue and an analysis more
consistent with the implied doctrines of preemption. A purposive
approach would have required the Court to engage in a meaningful
analysis of the purpose underlying the anti-alienation and QDRO
provisions and would have promoted the policy considerations relevant in the preemption context, as discussed in subparts IV.B.3(a)-(b).
These considerations are key components of the traditional approach
to implied preemption and the balance struck by the Court to ensure
the appropriate accommodation between federal and state authority
to regulate. The Court's textual approach in Boggs unduly limited
these aspects of the analysis.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that a textual approach to statutory interpretation is incompatible with the implied
preemption analysis. Thus, as the Court shifts away from the categorical preemption paradigm and begins integrating the implied doctrines into the express preemption analysis, the Court should also
shift away from a textual approach to discerning congressional intent
to preempt. The implied theories of preemption, especially the
"stands as an obstacle" theory, require an approach that will ensure a
meaningful search for the purpose underlying the federal law and a
meaningful presumption against preemption, and that will permit
courts to resolve the preemption issue in a manner that promotes a
harmonious fabric of the law.

V. CONCLUSION
As the Court moves toward a preemption continuum in which
implied theories of preemption may inform the express preemption
analysis, difficult conceptual and interpretative issues must be confronted. In future cases, the Court should address the conceptual
issues avoided in Boggs and more appropriately delimit the use of the
implied theories in cases involving a federal law with an express
preemption clause. Specifically, the Court should follow the approach
initiated by the dissenting Justices in Boggs and thoughtfully integrate the implied theories into the existing doctrinal framework developed for the express preemption provision at issue.
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The Court should also confront the interpretive issue arising
from the integration of a theory developed during a period when the
Court used a more purposive approach to interpretation into an
analysis grounded in a textual approach to interpretation. Although a
textual approach to statutory interpretation may be workable in many
contexts, the approach is incompatible with the fundamental tenets
underlying the preemption doctrine. Implied conflict preemption
turns on the purpose to be attributed to the federal law. Further,
preemption constitutes a distinct type of policy statement by the
legislature because it inherently raises the core federalism question of
which government, federal or state, has the authority to regulate.
Thus, rather than a textual and "purported" search for congressional
intent, the implied doctrines require an approach which ensures a
meaningful search for congressional purpose and permits courts to
promote fundamental policies implicated in the preemption context.
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This Article explores the implications of retail competition in public
utility markets, particularlyelectricity, for customer service obligations. The
common law duty to serve, encompassing both service extension and continuation obligations,has a strong basis in economic efficiency. As utility markets
are restructuredaround a competitive model, however, the nature and justifications for extraordinaryservice obligations must be reassessed. This Article
assesses the structure and financing of utility service obligations in various
institutionalmarket settings. The Article concludes that, in a retail competition environment, extraordinaryservice obligations should not extend to service suppliers and marketers, but should be limited to distributionutilities. As
a structurefor implementing and financing service obligations, mandated bidding ofpower supply into a power exchange coupled with financing through a
distributionsurcharge is advocated over alternatives as a way of minimizing
the inefficiency of imposing extraordinaryservice obligations. In addition, the
possibility of competition in distribution and its implications for service financing are explored.

